

12 DECEMBER 1947

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of  
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12 DECEMBER 1947

I N D E X  
Of  
EXHIBITS

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Def. No.</u>	<u>Pros. No.</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>For Ident.</u>	<u>In Evidence</u>
	3600		Pamphlet entitled "Observations of the Japanese Government on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry	35152	
2899	3601		Affidavit of INOUE, Saburo		35158
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2900	3604		Affidavit of Prince HIGASHIKUNI, Naruhiko		35169
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1 Friday, 12 December 1947

2 - - -

3 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
4 FOR THE FAR EAST  
5 Court House of the Tribunal  
6 War Ministry Building  
7 Tokyo, Japan

8 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
9 at 0930.

10 Appearances:

11 For the Tribunal, all Members sitting, with  
12 the exception of: HONORABLE JUSTICE SIR WILLIAM F.  
13 WEBB, Member from the Commonwealth of Australia, not  
14 sitting from 0930 to 1600.

15 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

16 For the Defense Section, same as before.

17 - - -

18 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
19 to English interpretation was made by the  
20 Language Section, IMTFE.)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 ACTING PRESIDENT: All the accused are pres-  
4 ent except MATSUI who is represented by counsel. We  
5 have a certificate from the prison surgeon at Sugamo  
6 certifying that he is ill and unable to attend the  
7 trial today. The certificate will be recorded and  
8 filed.

9 Has Mr. Caudle finished his redirect?

10 MR. CAUDLE: Just one question, your Honor.  
11 Before asking the witness a question, I'd like to call  
12 attention of the Court to the last four documents  
13 introduced by Mr. Sandusky yesterday, namely, exhibit  
14 3596A, 3596B, 3597A and 3598. It seems that 3597A and  
15 3598 were introduced for identification only, and only  
16 excerpts from these documents were placed in evidence.  
17 We desire to request that the entire documents be  
18 placed in evidence, not to be read at the present time  
19 but in order that we may refer to them in summation.

20 ACTING PRESIDENT: They may be so admitted.

21 MR. CAUDLE: And also, if you please --

22 ACTING PRESIDENT: Wait until the Clerk gives  
23 a number to them.

24 MR. CAUDLE: They already have an exhibit num-  
25 ber but only for identification.



1           ACTING PRESIDENT: Well, let them have the  
2 same exhibit No. and remove the "for identification  
3 only."

4           What are the two exhibit Nos. for identifi-  
5 cation?

6           MR. CAUDLE: 3597A and 3598.

7           ACTING PRESIDENT: Well, now, what is the  
8 situation?

9           MR. CAUDLE: All right, sir. He thinks it  
10 is in. I think it is not in. Like the man that  
11 trumped his partner's ace, I don't want to take a  
12 chance.

13           If it please the Tribunal, it seems there is  
14 some confusion. He insists it is in evidence; and,  
15 if it is in, I don't insist that it be placed in  
16 again.

17           ACTING PRESIDENT: Apparently, every document  
18 except the book was placed in evidence. The book  
19 itself was received for identification only, so the  
20 record can stand as it is.

21           MR. CAUDLE: Well, sir, there seems to be  
22 some conflict in the translations, and I would like  
23 to refer all four documents to the translation section.

24           ACTING PRESIDENT: You have all been told  
25 many times that you can do that without referring it

to the Tribunal.

1           MR. CAUDLE: I have just one question for  
2 the witness.

3                                 - - -

4 T O S H I O   S H I R A T O R I, an accused, resumed  
5 the stand and testified through Japanese interpret-  
6 ers as follows:

7                                 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

8 BY MR. CAUDLE (Continued):

9           Q   Mr. SHIRATORI, you stated on yesterday that  
10 you collaborated in the drafting of the Japanese reply  
11 to the Lytton Report. Please explain to the Tribunal  
12 just what part you took in the matter.

13           A   Among the persons mentioned by the prosecu-  
14 tor yesterday who participated in drafting the reply,  
15 one of the most important members was omitted, and  
16 that person was Dr. Baty, an Englishman, an adviser  
17 to the Foreign Office. My work was to put into Japan-  
18 ese the draft reply prepared in English by Dr. Baty.

19           Q   Then you had no part in the actual formula-  
20 tion of the document itself?

21           A   No.

22           THE MONITOR: Japanese court reporter.

23                                 (Whereupon, the Japanese court  
24 reporter read.)  
25



THE INTERPRETER: Not much.

1 MR. CAUDLE: I think Mr. Brooks has some  
2 questions.

3 ACTING PRESIDENT: Mr. Brooks.

4 MR. BROOKS: If the Tribunal please, on  
5 page 35 --  
6

7 ACTING PRESIDENT: Pardon me. For which  
8 accused?

9 MR. BROOKS: For MINAMI.

10 MR. SANDUSKY: May it please the Tribunal, I  
11 am informed this is not cross-examination.

12 MR. BROOKS: Certainly not. I wouldn't be  
13 here. On redirect.

14 THE MONITOR: Will the court reporter repeat  
15 that statement?

16 (Whereupon, the last statement  
17 was read by the official court reporter.)

18 MR. BROOKS: That should be clarified by  
19 saying, I wouldn't be here at this time. This is  
20 the time for redirect.  
21  
22  
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## REDIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

1  
2 BY MR. BROOKS:

3 Q Mr. Witness, at page 35,082, the question  
4 was asked: "Is it not true that in October 1932 you  
5 were appointed a member of a committee entitled,  
6 'Committee for Drafting the Protest to the Lytton  
7 Report'?"--and you answered: "No such committee was  
8 ever created for such a specific purpose, but I did  
9 take part in drafting the Japanese reply to the  
10 Lytton Report."

11 Now, as I understand, in your last answer  
12 to your counsel that this drafting of the Japanese  
13 reply was merely a transcribing from the English into  
14 Japanese and, I take it from that, that we may infer  
15 that the original draft was therefore not prepared  
16 by you and was prepared in English by other personnel?

17 A Yes.

18 Q However, you are familiar, of course, with  
19 the reply in its entirety, are you not?

20 A Well, at that time I remembered the contents  
21 very well but today I have completely forgotten.  
22 However, if I may see a copy I might refresh my memory.

23 Q I wanted to ask you if the copy that was  
24 shown you yesterday that was marked exhibit 3427-A,  
25 if that is the original reply from the Japanese filed



1 with the commission or if that was just a copy from  
2 a Japanese source of the original?

3 ACTING PRESIDENT: How does this affect  
4 MINAMI?

5 MR. BROOKS: I will connect it up, I promise  
6 you, your Honor.

7 A I think it is the original of the Japanese--  
8 Correction: I think it is a pamphlet published by the  
9 Foreign Office based upon the original of the Japanese  
10 reply.

11 Q Now I will hand you an official document of  
12 the series of the League of Nations publications of  
13 Political Division VII for 1932. This official docu-  
14 ment of the League of Nations series is marked, if  
15 you will look at the front, Mr. Witness, C775 M366,  
16 1932, VII, is it not?

17 A Yes.

18 Q In the lower corner of that document is it  
19 not stamped as an official document by the publisher  
20 of the series of League of Nations publications,  
21 Political Subdivision VII for 1932?

22 A Yes, as you say.

23 Q Now, can you tell from a perusal of that  
24 document if it is a copy published by the League of  
25 Nations body and made from the original report or

reply which they must have received from the Japanese?

1       A   Well, I have no time to read the entire  
2 document here now, but from the entire form as I see  
3 it here, I believe that this is probably as you say.

4       Q   An official document from the League of  
5 Nations?

6       A   I do not think there is any mistake about that.

7       Q   And does the subject matter contained therein  
8 cover the reply verbatim that you took part in drafting  
9 from the English to the Japanese?  
10

11      A   I believe that it is so.

12      Q   Now I want to ask you another question or  
13 two before I come back to that document.

14           At the time of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet, you have  
15 testified, I believe, that you were in the Foreign  
16 Office?

17      A   Yes.

18      Q   That Baron SHIDEHARA was the Minister for  
19 Foreign Affairs and that General MINAMI was the  
20 Minister of War in that cabinet?

21      A   Yes.

22      Q   Now, in preparing this reply to the commis-  
23 sion, did you make any-- in your preparation did you  
24 run onto any comments as to instructions by Japanese  
25 officials in relation to forbidding the participation



1 by Japanese in various attempts to establish a new  
2 political authority in Manchuria?

3 A I believe that such instructions of the  
4 Japanese Government were incorporated or quoted in  
5 the reply.

6 Q Can you state anything as to the date that  
7 such instructions to Japanese officials in Manchuria  
8 were given?

9 A With regard to the date I have no recollection.

10 Q Would it refresh your recollection if I  
11 would say that on the 26th of September instructions  
12 were issued to the Japanese officials in Manchuria  
13 strictly forbidding participation by any Japanese  
14 in various attempts to establish a new political  
15 authority in Manchuria?

16 A Yes, I think somewhere about that time.

17 ACTING PRESIDENT: Mr. Brooks, my attention  
18 has been called to this rule of the Court: "Other  
19 counsel for individual accused may examine a witness  
20 on redirect examination only on matters brought out  
21 on cross-examination and specifically relating to his  
22 client and not covered by the general redirect examin-  
23 ation."  
24

25 What was brought out on cross-examination  
specifically relating to MINAMI?

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1 MR. BROOKS: Specifically, I wouldn't say  
2 that there was anything specifically. However, there  
3 was cross-examination into the matters of the relations  
4 between the Foreign Office, of which this man was a  
5 member, and the War Ministry, of which MINAMI was the  
6 head. And there was suggestions that some of the younger  
7 members of the War Ministry may have been trying to  
8 get information for something that the prosecution may  
9 later try to label as improper activities on their part.  
10 I want to show the position of the War Minister in this  
11 matter and the way that I am trying to do that is to  
12 show what his action had been to this witness' testi-  
13 mony, and what the purpose of this reply was and also  
14 how in the War Ministry MINAMI and others relied upon  
15 the information that they obtained to this reply from  
16 the Foreign Ministry.

17 My examination is especially aimed at starting  
18 at page 35,072 and thereafter in the references of the  
19 prosecution to the younger officers of the War Ministry.  
20 I want to find from this examination I am into now how  
21 much information this man has on this point which I can  
22 prove in the official publication from the League of  
23 Nations that he did have knowledge of, and follow that  
24 with the documents that he saw or may have seen during  
25 this period.



MR. SANDUSKY: Mr. President.

ACTING PRESIDENT: Mr. Sandusky.

MR. SANDUSKY: In our submission the grounds for continuing this line of questioning as proposed by Mr. Brooks are clearly beyond the scope of the ruling as quoted by the President. We submit he is confined to facts and matters brought out in cross-examination rather than the supposition of the inferences that may be drawn from them later. As I understood counsel, he is anticipating -- he is conducting this examination in anticipation of additional evidence on this point. On the precise point of the relationship of material on cross-examination to defendant MINAMI, I think it should be pointed out to the Court that defendant MINAMI left the position of War Minister on December 14, 1931, with the fall of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet, and that the committee, or commission, formal or informal as it may have been, of which Mr. SHIRATORI was a member, gathered to draft the protest to the Lytton Report was not until at least October of the next year.

I, therefore, object to the line of questioning which is calculated to bring into evidence a document which has been rejected on several occasions.

MR. BROOKS: I would like to ask the witness a question when this reply was drafted because I am not

certain of that.

1           ACTING PRESIDENT: Not until we decide this  
2 question.

3           Objection sustained by a majority.

4           MR. BROOKS: What is my position now as I  
5 understand it, your Honor? Is the Court saying --

6           ACTING PRESIDENT: Your position now is that  
7 this line of cross-examination must be discontinued.

8           MR. BROOKS: I understand that that is upon the  
9 objection of the prosecution that MINAMI is not impli-  
10 cated in the cross-examination and the Court says that  
11 I don't have that right to cross-examine since my  
12 accused is not implicated in it.

13           ACTING PRESIDENT: Whatever understanding you  
14 have is your own.

15           MR. BROOKS: I would like to ask that the docu-  
16 ment handed the witness be marked for identification  
17 as exhibit 3427A since it is an official publication of  
18 the League of Nations and not a copy as was so in the  
19 other instances. And I would like for the record to  
20 show that I made the proffer of proof and an offer at  
21 this time of this document into evidence for that  
22 purpose for the part shown on page 28, the second full  
23 paragraph therein, for the defense of General MINAMI.  
24

25           CLERK OF THE COURT: Pamphlet entitled



1 Observations of the Japanese Government on the Report  
2 of the Commission of Inquiry will receive exhibit No.  
3 3600 for identification only.

4 (Whereupon, the document above  
5 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
6 No. 3600 for identification.)

7 MR. SANDUSKY: Mr. President, I object to the  
8 admission into evidence of any excerpt of the exhibit  
9 just offered for identification.

10 ACTING PRESIDENT: You don't have to object  
11 ahead of time.

12 MR. SANDUSKY: I understood, sir -- Mr. Presi-  
13 dent, I wasn't clear myself, but counsel informs me --

14 MR. BROOKS: I made a proffer. I made a  
15 proffer and in making the proffer I offered it into  
16 evidence for the record's purposes.

17 ACTING PRESIDENT: In order that the record  
18 may be straight, the document that you offered for  
19 identification is admitted for identification only.  
20 Any other documents that you offered, if you did offer  
21 any are --

22 MR. BROOKS: All in the same document. I of-  
23 fered it into evidence. After having it marked for iden-  
24 tification I offered it into evidence and Mr. Sandusky  
25 was objecting to it.

1           ACTING PRESIDENT: Whatever the situation is,  
2 such documents, if any, are rejected.

3           MR. BROOKS: I thought, your Honor, since this  
4 was an official document itself, it could not have  
5 the objection that it was propaganda or something of  
6 that sort. There was no proper objection against it.  
7 That is why I offered it.

8           MR. CAUDLE: Mr. President.

9           ACTING PRESIDENT: Mr. Caudle.

10          MR. CAUDLE: We have concluded the present-  
11 ation of evidence on behalf of the accused SHIRATORI  
12 at this time.

13          ACTING PRESIDENT: The witness will resume  
14 his place in the dock.

15               (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)  
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1 DR. TAKAYANAGI: Mr. President, I am  
2 TAKAYANAGI, counsel for the accused SUZUKI, and  
3 desire to read the opening statement on his behalf.

4 ACTING PRESIDENT: Wait until the Members  
5 of the Tribunal have received their copies.

6 DR. TAKAYANAGI: Our opening statement for  
7 the accused SUZUKI is brief. "Brevity" is said to be  
8 "the soul of wit" but we hope that in this particular  
9 instance it will also be a symbol of innocence.

10 1. The prosecution accused SUZUKI for the  
11 interest he evinced in politics around the years 1931  
12 and 1932 (page 16,927 of the record). In order to  
13 show that such interest was not of any sinister but  
14 on the contrary of a laudable kind, we shall produce  
15 the witness, INOUE, Saburo. He will testify as to the  
16 circumstances in which SUZUKI became acquainted with  
17 Prince KONOYE, Marquis KIDO and Baron HARADA, and also  
18 as to the reason for, and the character of, the con-  
19 versations which SUZUKI conducted with Marquis KIDO  
20 and Baron HARADA.

21 2. The prosecution appears to imply that the  
22 Commodity Mobilization Plan and other plans, in the  
23 preparation of which SUZUKI was engaged after his  
24 appointment as President of the Planning Board, had  
25 as their aim and object the initiation of hostilities

1 against America and Great Britain. In order to show  
2 that they were nothing of the kind, we already called  
3 as witness, MAYAMA, Kanji, former investigator of the  
4 Planning Board. We call the attention of the Tribunal  
5 to his testimony which is to be found on pages 18,357  
6 to 18,379 of the record.

7 3. Mr. Liebert alleges in his testimony  
8 (page 8,406 of the record), that SUZUKI, as President  
9 of the Planning Board, controlled Japanese economy  
10 conjointly with the heads of the Control Associations.  
11 In order to show that the President of the Planning  
12 Board had nothing to do with the Control Associations  
13 we propose to produce defense document No. 2839-A, B,  
14 and C.

15 4. The prosecution accuses SUZUKI of a politi-  
16 cal role he played during the last days of the Third  
17 KONOYE Cabinet. We admit that SUZUKI played some part  
18 toward the formation of the succeeding cabinet by  
19 Prince HIGASHIKUNI. In order to show, however, that  
20 the endeavors of the accused were motivated by his  
21 earnest desire to bring diplomatic negotiations with  
22 America to a success, we shall call HIGASHIKUNI,  
23 Naruhiko to testify as to how SUZUKI beseeched him to  
24 consent to form the succeeding cabinet, if so directed  
25 by the Emperor, with the view of warding off an armed



1 conflict with America.

2 5. The prosecution attempted to show in  
3 reliance on an account in a document entitled "The  
4 "Foreign Affairs Monthly Report" that the Planning  
5 Board had something to do with the transfer and em-  
6 ployment of prisoners of war (page 16,935 of the  
7 record). In order to show that the prosecution is  
8 entirely in error, we shall call KAMEYAMA, Koichi,  
9 former head of the Third Division of the Planning  
10 Board to testify that the report mentioned above was  
11 prepared without any knowledge on the part of the  
12 Planning Board and that the account contained therein  
13 is entirely mistaken.

14 6. Lastly, we shall call the accused SUZUKI  
15 himself to the witness-box to testify regarding his  
16 acts during the period covered by the Indictment, the  
17 nature and character thereof, and the attending cir-  
18 cumstances. His position in relation to China will  
19 be indicated by the testimony of Mr. Hu-Lin and will  
20 be offered by defense document 197.

21 We desire to state here that at this stage  
22 of the proceedings we deemed it proper and did our best  
23 to prepare and arrange the evidence for the accused  
24 in an objective rather than in a contentious spirit,  
25 or may we possibly say in that frame of mind which

1 characterized Benedictus de Spinoza, the Dutch  
2 philosopher, when he declared in a magisterial air,  
3 "Humanas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque  
4 destestari, sed intelligere."

5 Mr. Levin will now proceed to present evi-  
6 dence on behalf of the accused SUZUKI.

7 ACTING PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

8 MR. LEVIN: May it please the Tribunal.

9 We offer in evidence defense document No.  
10 2899, the affidavit of INOUE, Saburo, in relation to  
11 General SUZUKI's activities in the early 30's.

12 The prosecution has advised us that they do  
13 not propose to cross-examine any of the witnesses  
14 who will testify on behalf of the accused.

15 ACTING PRESIDENT: It will be admitted in  
16 evidence.

17 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2899  
18 will receive exhibit No. 3601.

19 (Whereupon, the document above  
20 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
21 No. 3601 and received in evidence.)

22 MR. LEVIN: I proceed to read exhibit 3601,  
23 omitting the formal parts.

24 "1. I was Marquis, member of the House of  
25 Peers and Major General of the Japanese Army. Since



1 my childhood I have had close associations with KIDO,  
2 Koichi, and KONOYE, Fumimaro, by reason of my father's  
3 friendly intercourse with their families. Baron HARADA,  
4 Kumao, private secretary to Prince SAIONJI, the Elder  
5 Statesman, has become also an intimate friend of mine  
6 through KIDO and KONOYE.

7 "2. During my service in the Army I came to  
8 contract close friendship with SUZUKI, Teiichi. He  
9 was my good companion in golf tournaments as well as  
10 in 'chanoyu', the tea ceremony.

11 "3. I often invited KIDO, KONOYE, HARADA and  
12 SUZUKI to dinner parties at my home. As SUZUKI often  
13 met KIDO and the others at my home, he seemed to have  
14 also become friendly with them.

15 "4. I was informed about a projected coup  
16 d'etat called the March Incident some time after it had  
17 been disclosed. It was my belief that SUZUKI's admoni-  
18 tions to the insurgents had been one of the patent  
19 factors in checking the outbreak of this incident.  
20 I once told my close friend HARADA something to that  
21 effect.  
22

23 "5. Around August and September, 1931 (Showa 6)  
24 rumors regarding the March Incident gradually began to  
25 spread. And along with this an increasing tendency  
appeared among young captains and lieutenants to discuss

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not only politics but even almost openly to advocate  
the necessity of national renovation by the use of  
military force.



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1 "Judging from what I was told by KIDO and  
2 HARADA, Count MAKINO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal,  
3 and Prince SAIONJI, the Elder Statesmen were most  
4 worried about unlawful movements of this kind. With  
5 a view to smoothing the way for the sound development  
6 of parliamentary government, they ordered them (KIDO  
7 and HARADA) to collect information and discuss with  
8 some of the moderate and right minded officers of the  
9 army to study the methods of maintaining military  
10 discipline in the army.

11 "Probably it was for this reason that,  
12 when KIDO, HARADA and SUZUKI met at dinner parties or  
13 tea ceremony at my home, KIDO and HARADA often put  
14 questions to SUZUKI and myself about the state of  
15 affairs in the army and sounded our views concerning  
16 the maintenance of military discipline. These meet-  
17 ings were not, however, held for any political purpose.  
18 They were ordinary social gatherings among friends, in  
19 the course of which politics were incidentally dis-  
20 cussed."

21 Signed "INOUE, Saburo, on this 24th day of  
22 October, 1947."

23 No. 3 on our order of proof, defense document  
24 No. 197, will be tendered with the evidence of Mr.  
25 SUZUKI.

1 I now offer defense document No. 2901,  
2 the affidavit of KAMEYAMA, Koichi, to the effect that  
3 the Planning Board had no authority in relation to  
4 prisoners of war.

5 ACTING PRESIDENT: It will be admitted in  
6 evidence.

7 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document No.  
8 2901 will receive exhibit No. 3602.

9 (Whereupon, the document above  
10 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
11 No. 3602 and received in evidence.)

12 MR. LEVIN: I now read defense document,  
13 exhibit 3602, the testimony of KAMEYAMA, Koichi, omitting  
14 the formal parts:

15 "1. I served as Director of the Third  
16 Division of the Planning Board from November, 1941,  
17 to July, 1943.

18 "2. The Planning Board was not invested with  
19 any authority whatsoever in relation to the management  
20 of the Prisoners of War, and the Planning Board did  
21 not formulate any principles for the transfer and  
22 employment of prisoners of war, nor was it, during my  
23 tenure of office, ever entrusted to do so.

24 "3. I was shown exhibit 1971(a), an abstract  
25 from the 'Foreign Affairs Monthly Report' for September,



1942, published by the Foreign Section of the Police  
Bureau of the Home Ministry.

"The statement in the first paragraph of  
the above exhibit considerably deviates from the actual  
facts. As for the second paragraph, I have not the  
slightest knowledge of such facts as mentioned therein.  
The actual situation in relation to the conference on  
August 15, 1942, mentioned in the first paragraph, was  
as follows:

"Early in August 1942 one of my subordinates  
in the Planning Board received a request by the Prisoners  
of War Information Bureau of the War Ministry of the  
following tenor:

"It was decided by the War Ministry that a  
portion of the Prisoners of War detained in the southern  
region be transferred to Japan Proper to be employed  
in domestic industries. We want to give an explanation  
relative to this matter to all the ministries concerned  
and we request that the Planning Board convene a  
meeting of the representatives of such ministries at  
a certain date so that an officer of the War Ministry  
may go and explain the matter."

"When officials of several ministries meet,  
the Planning Board had frequently lent its conference  
rooms for such purpose and also offered its services

for convening such meetings.

1           "One of my subordinates, therefore, con-  
2       sented to this request of the Prisoners of War Informa-  
3       tion Bureau and convened the meeting in behalf of the  
4       said bureau. The five principles enumerated in the  
5       first paragraph in exhibit 1971(A) was presumably one  
6       which was read by the War Ministry official in charge  
7       of the said bureau at the said meeting.

8           "4. The said meeting was decidedly not one  
9       held under the auspices of the Planning Board. It was  
10      a meeting held under the auspices of the Prisoners of  
11      War Information Bureau for which the Planning Board  
12      merely lent its conference room, and for the conven-  
13      ing of which it rendered its services according to the  
14      customary way in such cases. I had given my approval  
15      to the loan of the conference room, but I did not, of  
16      course, notify the president or the vice-president of  
17      such routine matters.

18           "5. The 'Foreign Affairs Monthly Report' was  
19      not distributed to the Planning Board."

20           Signed, "KAMEYAMA, Koichi, on this 27th day  
21      of August, 1947."

22           We offer in evidence defense document No.  
23      2839, A and B, in relation to control associations and  
24      which indicate the ministries that had competent  
25



authority over those. It will be noted this Planning Board had no jurisdiction over these ministries.

We will not read this but ask that it be made a part of the transcript of the record.

ACTING PRESIDENT: It will be admitted in evidence.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2839, A and B, will receive exhibit No. 3603.

MR. LEVIN: That exhibit number should include A and B in the principal one, that is, the three documents.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Correction: Defense document 2839 will receive exhibit No. 3603; defense document 2839A will receive exhibit No. 3603A; defense document 2839B will receive exhibit No. 3603B.

(Whereupon, the documents above referred to were marked defense exhibits Nos. 3603, 3603A, and 3603B, respectively, and received in evidence.)

MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, may the reporters be directed to transcribe these into the record.

ACTING PRESIDENT: They will do so.

(Defense exhibit No. 3603, which was not read, is as follows:)

1 "Name of Control Associations and their  
2 competent authorities regulated by the Act of Organiza-  
3 tions of Principal Industries.

4 "Name of Association: Shipbuilding Control  
5 Association.

6 "Date of Authorization: January 27, 1942.

7 "Competent Minister: Minister of Communi-  
8 cation."

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(Defense exhibit 3603-A, which was  
not read, is as follows:)

"Names of Control Associations and their  
competent authorities regulated by the Act of  
Organizations of Principal Industries.

Name of Association; Date Authorization;  
Competent Minister:

"Iron and Steel Control Association,  
April 26, 1941, Minister of Commerce and Industry;

"Coal Control Association, November 26,  
1941, ditto;

"Mines Control Association, December 28,  
1941, ditto;

"Cement Control Association, December 18,  
1941, ditto;

"Vehicles Control Association, December  
22, 1941, ditto;

"Automobile Control Association; December  
23, 1941, ditto;

"Precision Instruments Control Association,  
January 10, 1942, ditto;

"Electrical Machines Control Association,  
January 12, 1942, ditto;

"Industrial Machines Control Association,  
January 15, 1942, ditto;

1 "Metallic Industry Control Association,  
February 1, 1942, ditto;

2 "Light Metals Control Association,  
3 September 1, 1942, ditto;

4 "Hides and Leather Control Association,  
5 September 21, 1942, ditto;

6 "Oil and Grease Control Association,  
7 December 1, 1942, ditto;

8 "Chemical Industry Control Association,  
9 October 30, 1942, ditto.

10 "Rubber Control Association, January 25,  
11 1943, ditto;

12 "Fibre Control Association, October 31,  
13 1943, ditto."

14  
15 (Defense exhibit 3603-B, which was not  
16 read, is as follows:)

17 "Names of Control Associations and their  
18 competent authorities regulated by the Act of Organi-  
19 zations of Principal Industries.

20 "Name of Association, Date of Authorization,  
21 Competent Minister:

22 "The Railroad and Tramway Control Association,  
23 May 30, 1942, Minister of Transportation."

24 We now offer defense document No. 2900, the  
25 affidavit of Prince HIGASHIKUNI, Naruhiko in relation



1 to the selection of a Prime Minister on the fall of  
2 the Third KONOYE Cabinet and prior to the selection  
3 of TOJO as Prime Minister in October, 1941.

4 ACTING PRESIDENT: It will be admitted in  
5 evidence.

6 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2900  
7 will receive exhibit No. 3604.

8 (Whereupon, the document above re-  
9 ferred to was marked defense exhibit 3604 and  
10 received in evidence.)

11 MR. LEVIN: I now read exhibit 3604, the  
12 testimony of Prince HIGASHIKUNI, omitting the formal  
13 parts:

14 "1. On the eveing of October 15, 1941, the  
15 Prime Minister, Prince KONOYE, called at my residence  
16 and asked me to head the next cabinet since his cabinet  
17 had decided to resign.

18 "2. Early the next morning Teiichi SUZUKI,  
19 President of the Planning Board, called on me and made  
20 a statement to the following effect:

21 "I have been directed by the Prime Minister,  
22 Prince KONOYE, to explain to Your Highness the present  
23 condition of our national strength so that the same may  
24 duly be taken into account by Your Highness in the event  
25 your Highness forms the next cabinet. Recently, the

1 elements clamoring for a discontinuance of the  
2 American-Japanese negotiations and commencing a war  
3 against America and Britain are in the ascendant, but  
4 it is incumbent upon us to do our utmost to avoid such  
5 a war, and especially in view of the present condition  
6 of our national strength. Considering the negative  
7 attitude of the navy, which has to bear the brunt  
8 in the event of a war with America, it must be de-  
9 clared highly dangerous that army people should be  
10 urging for war. But since Prince KONOYE, is, after  
11 all, a mere subject, it is beyond his power to evade  
12 the war. There is no other alternative than to rely  
13 upon the prestige and influence of Your Highness. I,  
14 therefore, beg Your Highness' permission to explain  
15 the present state of our national strength as revealed  
16 in the 'Materials Mobilization Program' so that Your  
17 Highness might take that into account when the next  
18 cabinet is formed by Your Highness.'

19 "So saying, he explained the matter on the  
20 basis of relevant figures and he added, 'Not only  
21 Prince KONOYE, but I personally respectfully solicit  
22 Your Highness to condescend to form the cabinet, as  
23 this is most essential in view of the present condi-  
24 tions of our country.'

25 "3. On the evening of the same day, however,



1 Prince KONOYE sent a letter to me, through his  
2 private secretary, notifying me that the question  
3 regarding the resignation of his cabinet and the  
4 consequent cabinet formation by me had been shelved.

5 "4. I had urged Prime Minister, Prince  
6 KONOYE, on August 3 and on September 5, 1941, and  
7 also urged upon the War Minister, General TOJO, on  
8 September 7, 1941, that they do their level best to  
9 bring American-Japanese negotiations to a successful  
10 conclusion, thus allaying deep anxiety of His Majesty,  
11 the Emperor. I may presume, therefore, that both of  
12 them had a full understanding of my attitude toward  
13 the Japanese-American problem."

14 Signed, "HIGASHIKUNI, Naruhiko, on this 18  
15 day of October, 1947, at Tokyo."

16 I now call as a witness on his own behalf  
17 SUZUKI, Teiichi, whose testimony will be tendered by  
18 affidavit, defense document No. 2902.

19 ACTING PRESIDENT: We will recess at this  
20 time for fifteen minutes.

21 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was  
22 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings  
23 were resumed as follows:)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.  
3 ACTING PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.  
4 - - -

5 TEIICHI SUZUKI, an accused, being first  
6 duly sworn, testified through Japanese inter-  
7 preters as follows:  
8

DIRECT EXAMINATION

9 BY MR. LEVIN:

10 Q Will you please state your name?  
11 A SUZUKI, Teiichi.

12 Q Are you an accused in this case?  
13 A Yes.

14 MR. LEVIN: Will Captain Van Meter kindly  
15 hand the witness defense document No. 2902?  
16 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
17 to the witness.)

18 Q Does your signature appear on that document?  
19 A Yes.

20 Q Are the contents contained therein true and  
21 correct?  
22 A Yes.

23 MR. LEVIN: I offer in evidence defense  
24 document No. 2902, the testimony of SUZUKI, Teiichi,  
25 on his own behalf.

21 I was despa--  
22 financial and economic prac--  
23 October, 1920, I was ordered to be stationed at g-  
24 hai where I stayed to the end of March, 1922, to  
25 study Chinese affairs. From April, 1922, to August,



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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 ACTING PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

4 - - -

5 T E I I C H I S U Z U K I, an accused, being first  
6 duly sworn, testified through Japanese inter-  
7 preters as follows:

8 DIRECT EXAMINATION

9 BY MR. LEVIN:

10 Q Will you please state your name?

11 A SUZUKI, Teiichi.

12 Q Are you an accused in this case?

13 A Yes.

14 MR. LEVIN: Will Captain Van Meter kindly  
15 hand the witness defense document No. 2902?

16 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
17 to the witness.)

18 Q Does your signature appear on that document?

19 A Yes.

20 Q Are the contents contained therein true and  
21 correct?

22 A Yes.

23 MR. LEVIN: I offer in evidence defense  
24 document No. 2902, the testimony of SUZUKI, Teiichi,  
25 on his own behalf.

SUZUKI

DIRECT

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1           ACTING PRESIDENT: It will be admitted in  
2 evidence.

3           CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2902  
4 will receive exhibit No. 3605.

5                   (Whereupon, the document above  
6 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
7 No. 3605 and received in evidence.)

8           MR. LEVIN: I now read the evidence of  
9 SUZUKI, Teiichi, exhibit 3605:

10               "I, SUZUKI, Teiichi, having first been duly  
11 sworn on oath, in accordance with the procedure  
12 followed in my country, depose as follows:

13               "PART I

14               "(1) I was born in Chiba Prefecture on  
15 December 16, 1888. I graduated from the Military  
16 Academy on May 28, 1909, and was attached to the 18th  
17 Infantry Regiment (Toyohashi). In December, 1913,  
18 I was ordered to enter the Army Staff College from  
19 which I graduated on November 27, 1917. In 1918 I  
20 became attached to the General Staff Office. In 1919  
21 I was despatched to the Ministry of Finance to study  
22 financial and economic practice for one year. In  
23 October, 1920, I was ordered to be stationed at Shang-  
24 hai where I stayed to the end of March, 1922, to  
25 study Chinese affairs. From April, 1922, to August,



SUZUKI

DIRECT

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1 1923, I was a member of the General Staff. From  
2 September, 1923, to March, 1926, I was ordered to  
3 be stationed at Peking as Assistant Military Attache  
4 to the Japanese Legation. In April, 1926, I was  
5 attached to the 48th Infantry Regiment (Kurume) and  
6 in August of the same year, I was appointed Battalion  
7 Chief of the same Regiment. In 1927, I was a member  
8 of the General Staff Office. In February, 1929, I  
9 was sent, as a student to England, returning in  
10 October, 1929. On December 10, 1929, I was again  
11 appointed as Assistant Military Attache to the  
12 Japanese Legation in Peking. In January, 1931, I  
13 became attached to the Bureau of Military Affairs  
14 in the War Ministry. In August, 1933, I was appointed  
15 Chief of the Intelligence Corps of the War Ministry.  
16 On March 5, 1934, I was appointed Chief Secretary  
17 of the Research Section of the Army Staff College  
18 and concurrently instructor in Military Science. In  
19 May, 1935, I held the office of investigator at the  
20 Cabinet Bureau of Investigation. On August 1, 1936,  
21 I was appointed Regional Commander of the 14th In-  
22 fantry Regiment stationed at Tongning, Manchuria.  
23 In November, 1937, I was attached to the 16th Home  
24 Division, with Headquarters in Kyoto. In April, 1938,  
25 I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Third Army

1 Regiment stationed at Mutangian, Manchuria. On  
2 December 16, 1938, I was appointed Chief of the  
3 Political Section of the China Affairs Board. On  
4 April 4, 1941, I retired from military service having  
5 been placed on the reserve list and became Minister  
6 without Portfolio and concurrently President of the  
7 Planning Board in the Second KONOYE Cabinet, con-  
8 tinued as such in the Third KONOYE Cabinet and the  
9 TOJO Cabinet until I resigned on October 8, 1943.

10 "(2) As I look back upon my past life I  
11 feel that five things have deeply influenced my  
12 career, my outlook on life, and my political ideas.

13 "First, my training as a professional  
14 military man has naturally made me mainly interested  
15 in the problems of national defense. It also caused  
16 me to entertain a high regard for the traditions of  
17 strict discipline of the Japanese Army, for the  
18 maintenance of which I used my best endeavors when  
19 signs of slackness were manifested within the Army  
20 during those turbulent years since 1931. It instilled  
21 into me a spirit of self-sacrifice. It taught me that  
22 in case my country was in danger I should sacrifice my  
23 all for the sake of my country.

24 "Second, my studies in financial and economic  
25 affairs at the Finance Ministry in 1919 aroused in me



1 a lively interest in the practical problems of national  
2 economy. This interest was further intensified, during  
3 my service as a Cabinet investigator in 1935-6, by com-  
4 ing into personal contact with officials of various  
5 Ministries and with a number of economic experts. The  
6 above experience, of a non-military character, enlarged  
7 my mental vision and taught me, for instance, to look  
8 at problems of national defence, not in themselves  
9 alone, but in the texture of the entire national life.  
10 This broader view of national defence was especially  
11 helpful in doing my work as president of the Planning  
12 Board, the practical function of which, prior to  
13 December 1, 1941, lay not so much in making smooth the  
14 way for military preparations, as in moderating the  
15 demands of the armed services, so as to safeguard the  
16 national economic life, which was becoming more and  
17 more strained through the China Incident extending over  
18 four years.

19 "Third, my sojourn in England as a student  
20 during the year 1929, though not a long one, exerted a  
21 deep influence on my modes of thought. It taught me  
22 to look at my country objectively and from an inter-  
23 national standpoint. It made me deeply conscious of  
24 the shortcomings, spiritual and material of our people  
25 as well as of our backwardness in natural science, and

1 saved me from that blind and narrow-minded patriotism  
2 which military education is apt to cultivate.

3 "Fourth, my frequent contact with China and  
4 the Chinese was no small factor for moulding my life  
5 and thought. My father was a student of Chinese clas-  
6 sics and my home education was such to arouse my  
7 interest in things Chinese. Then my stay in Shanghai  
8 during October, 1920, to March, 1922, and my sojourn in  
9 Peking during September, 1923, to March, 1926, and  
10 during January, 1930, to January, 1931, as Assistant  
11 Military Attache to the Japanese Legation, afforded me  
12 ample opportunity to become intimately acquainted with  
13 the Chinese people and to cultivate friendships with  
14 many leaders in China. It enabled me to study political  
15 affairs in China at close range which made me sympa-  
16 thetic with the Chinese nationalist movement. In Jan-  
17 uary, 1927, I was despatched as a liaison officer by  
18 War Minister UGAKI to meet General Chiang Kai-shek,  
19 then on his northern expedition. I had an interview  
20 with him at Kiukiang and learned from him his ideas  
21 and aspirations he cherished regarding the execution of  
22 the Chinese Revolution. Thereafter, my sympathy for  
23 the nationalist movement was all the more intensified.  
24 Most of my Chinese friends were thus of the Kuomintang  
25 Party, not military men of the old school. Again,



1 during 1931-1933, I was assigned, as part of my duties,  
2 the task of assisting the supervision and guidance of  
3 visiting Chinese military students. I taught the his-  
4 tory of Chinese nationalism to the students of the  
5 Army Staff College, when I served as instructor in that  
6 institution.

7 All these experiences naturally deepened my  
8 understanding of and moulded my friendly attitude to-  
9 ward the Chinese people. They had cultivated my con-  
10 viction that the aspirations of the Chinese people for  
11 the recovery of her national rights would be realized  
12 in due course of time and that Japan should assist and  
13 co-operate with the New China represented by the Nation-  
14 alist Party. The course of events in the Sino-Japanese  
15 relations ran contrary to the direction I hoped for,  
16 but my views on China's destiny did not thereby suffer  
17 any change. I have read an affidavit by Mr. Hu Lin,  
18 defence document 197, obtained by my American counsel  
19 during his recent trip to China. I am glad to know  
20 that one of my Chinese friends understands me thorough-  
21 ly, even after these deplorable years of military con-  
22 flict between the two nations, though I feel ashamed  
23 to think and regard it as a tragedy that I was utterly  
24 helpless in checking the catastrophic course of Far  
25 Eastern politics."

1           At this time, may it please the Tribunal,  
2 I offer in evidence ~~defense document~~ No. 197, the  
3 affidavit of Mr. Hu Lin, which relates to the  
4 defendant's attitude toward China.

5           ACTING PRESIDENT: Brigadier Nolan.

6           BRIGADIER NOLAN: If it please the Tribunal,  
7 the prosecution objects to a large portion of this  
8 document, 197.

9           The second paragraph on the first page, beginning  
10 with the words "I have known..." deal with matters which  
11 occurred in the year 1927 and are immaterial to any  
12 issue raised in this case. It is submitted that this  
13 paragraph has no probative value and should be excluded.

14           With regard to the third paragraph, which  
15 begins on the bottom of page one, the prosecution objects  
16 to the first and last sentence in that paragraph. Those  
17 are the sentences beginning with the words "At that  
18 time..." and "In those years..." And the objection is  
19 based upon the ground that it contains only the opinion  
20 of the deponent.

21           The prosecution objects to the last paragraph  
22 with the exception of the first six lines. That portion  
23 of the paragraph beginning with the words "From my  
24 information..." down to the end of the paragraph, sets  
25 out certain reasons of the deponent which prompted



1 him to form an opinion which is set out in that para-  
2 graph. It is submitted that this matter is objectionable  
3 and ought to be excluded from the record.

4 ACTING PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

5 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, I have no serious  
6 objection to the omission of the first sentence in  
7 paragraph three and the last sentence of that paragraph.

8 In relation to the objection pertaining to  
9 paragraph two, the first one that was made, that relates  
10 to 1927, of course is not tenable because that is merely  
11 a preliminary statement as to when the witness met  
12 SUZUKI. The Ta Kung Pao Press of Shanghai and other  
13 cities in China is the "New York Times" of China. Mr.  
14 Hu Lin who had a very excellent opportunity of knowing  
15 SUZUKI and knowing what he did, knew the things he did,  
16 is able to state them. As a matter of fact, it  
17 supplements the statement made by Mr. SUZUKI in his  
18 affidavit on page 3, where he said that his acquaintance-  
19 ship in Japan afforded him opportunity to become  
20 intimately acquainted with the Chinese people and to  
21 cultivate friendships with many leaders in China.

22 It is indicated in the last sentence of para-  
23 graph 2 -- and in view of the fact that the Members of  
24 the Tribunal have the affidavit before them, I think  
25 I may call direct attention to it -- that he sympathized

1 with the Kuomintang and advocated that Japan should  
2 help bring forth cooperation between the Generalissimo  
3 and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. The relations between  
4 China and Japan were a matter of great importance.

5 We have had evidence here that certain persons  
6 belonged to military cliques. Here is a distinguished  
7 publicist of China indicating -- who testifies in this  
8 affidavit as to the attitude and views of Mr. SUZUKI  
9 in relation to China and Japan. Except in relation  
10 to the sentences which I have conceded, it seems to  
11 me that this evidence is proper.

12 I might add, also, that when I took this affidavit  
13 we had had no specific ruling from the Court in relation  
14 to opinion evidence. And while I do not concede that it  
15 is opinion evidence, nevertheless, I am very certain  
16 that had I known of that ruling at that time, I might  
17 very well have worded this affidavit in such a way  
18 that there would be no objection to its admissibility,  
19 in any event.

21 ACTING PRESIDENT: By a majority the objection  
22 is sustained as to the first sentence and the last  
23 sentence of the paragraph starting at the bottom of page  
24 one, and as to the next paragraph except the first six  
25 lines.

~~With that exception the affidavit may be~~



admitted in evidence.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 197  
2 will receive exhibit No. 3606.

3 (Whereupon, the document above re-  
4 ferred to was marked defense exhibit No. 3606  
5 and received in evidence.)

6 MR. LEVIN: I read the testimony of Hu Lin,  
7 exhibit No. 3606, as admitted in evidence by the Tribunal.

8 "I, Hu Lin, do swear on my conscience, that the  
9 following is true:

10 "My name is Hu Lin, and I am a resident of  
11 Shanghai, China, and have been for upwards of fifty  
12 years. I read, write and understand the English  
13 language. I am presently one of the owners, general  
14 manager, publisher and one of the editors of the Ta  
15 Kung Pao Press, published at 212 Nanking Road, Shanghai,  
16 China. The Ta Kung Pao Press is published in Shanghai,  
17 Chungking and Tientsin, and has one of the largest  
18 circulations of any newspaper published in Shanghai.  
19 In 1945 I was a delegate to the San Francisco Conference  
20 representing China at this conference for the establish-  
21 ment of the United Nations' Organization; in 1943 I  
22 was a member of a Chinese Mission which was sent to  
23 Great Britain for the purpose of integrating the war  
24 effort.  
25

"I have known and been personally acquainted with Lieutenant General SUZUKI, Teiichi, of Japan for upwards of almost twenty-five years. As a publisher I have been familiar with the relations of China and Japan for many years. When I was on my way to Hankow in 1927, I met General SUZUKI for the first time aboard a ship and we stayed in the same cabin. We talked a lot. At that time, my paper was published in North China which was then under the rule of warlords. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had just started his North Expedition and China had not yet been unified. I came to the South with the purpose to investigate the Kuomintang rule. When I met SUZUKI, I discovered him to be a scholar, though a soldier by profession. He knew much about political and economical problems. He sympathized with the Kuomintang and advocated that Japan should help bring forth cooperation between the Generalissimo and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

"Then I met him once or twice in Peiping later on. In 1935 I went to Japan and called on him at his house. The Sino-Japanese relationship was getting worse by that time and he still advocated Sino-Japanese cooperation. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, my paper was evacuated to the interior and personal relations with my Japanese friends were cut



off. In those years --" that is out.

1 "I knew that his father had had a sympathetic  
2 interest in China and had at one time taught Chinese  
3 to Japanese students. I knew too that General SUZUKI  
4 had trained and worked with Chinese students who came  
5 to Japan for military training. I have known too that  
6 during the war he was a president of the Planning  
7 Board and a member of the Cabinet without portfolio.  
8 From my information and knowledge of his career and  
9 from the fact --"

10 ACTING PRESIDENT: That is out.

11 MR. LEVIN: (Reading continued)

12 "This affidavit was prepared after consultation  
13 with me from information given by me, and thereafter  
14 I carefully examined and studied same and the facts  
15 made therein conform to the facts as I knew them in  
16 relation to General SUZUKI, Teiichi.

17 "/S/ Hu Lin

18 "On the 12th day of December, 1946."  
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1 I continue with SUZUKI's testimony, the  
2 last paragraph at the bottom of page 4:

3 "Lastly, not only was my view of Japanese  
4 politics, national and international, deeply in-  
5 fluenced, but the last phase of my official career  
6 as a civilian administrator and statesman was deter-  
7 mined by my frequent contacts with Prince KONOYE,  
8 Marquis KIDO, and Baron HARADA. Since my name is  
9 often mentioned in KIDO's diary, it might also be  
10 proper for me to elucidate here my relations with  
11 them.

12 "There were among my seniors in the army  
13 Marquis INOUE, Saburo. Marquis INOUE was never  
14 my immediate superior officer in the army, but since  
15 as early as in 1919, when Marquis INOUE and I, then a  
16 lieutenant, were assigned at the Finance Ministry  
17 to study financial and economic affairs together,  
18 we became very friendly with each other. Marquis  
19 INOUE, therefore, often invited me to join him in  
20 golf tournaments or to assist at tea-ceremony held  
21 at his residence.

22 "Marquis INOUE was a man of noble birth and  
23 of sound moderate views, having been educated in  
24 England. He was rather of a quiet disposition and  
25 did not enjoy a wide circle of friends. He was,



SUZUKI

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1 however, on very intimate terms with Prince KONOYE,  
2 Fumimaro, Marquis KIDO, Koichi, whom he had known  
3 from his childhood and through them also with Baron  
4 HARADA, Kumao. Thus when I was invited by Marquis  
5 INOUE, naturally I had opportunities to meet KONOYE,  
6 KIDO, and HARADA, with whom I also became quite  
7 intimate. In the course of golf tournaments or  
8 dinner parties KIDO and HARADA often inquired of me  
9 regarding the internal conditions of the army.  
10 Since about July, 1931 especially, they seemed to be  
11 keenly interested to obtain information about the  
12 state of the army circles. Various rumors had then  
13 been afloat concerning what is generally known as the  
14 March Affair, and Prince SAIONJI, the Elder States-  
15 man, and Count MAKINO, the Keeper of the Privy Seal,  
16 for whom HARADA and KIDO were secretaries respect-  
17 ively, were seriously concerned over the rumored sub-  
18 versive activities of army officers and directed their  
19 secretaries to gather information and study measures  
20 for keeping them under control. As I looked upon  
21 HARADA and KIDO as my close friends, I used to tell  
22 them frankly about what I knew.

23 "After that I told them from time to time  
24 about the state of affairs within the army. Through  
25 our informal frank and friendly chats about politics,

1 I could also obtain much information regarding the  
2 inside movements of the political world. Prince  
3 KONOYE, Marquis KIDO, and Baron HARADA were ardent  
4 admirers of Prince SAIONJI's liberalism in politics  
5 and their political views exerted no small influence  
6 upon me.

7 "During 1936-1938, when my assignments were  
8 in Manchuria and at Kyoto, our intimate contacts were  
9 for a time suspended. However, since December 1938,  
10 when I was removed to Tokyo to assume my work at the  
11 China Affairs Board, our contacts were resumed. It  
12 was chiefly my friendship with Prince KONOYE and  
13 the latter's confidence in me by reason of my long  
14 association with him that made me give up my long  
15 military career in April 1941.

16 "(3) My views on international political  
17 affairs affecting Japan, a statement of which will be  
18 helpful in elucidating the nature of my behavior on  
19 various occasions, may be outlined as follows:

20 "As stated above, I felt much sympathy for  
21 the Chinese nationalist movement, and my Chinese  
22 friends were mainly personalities connected with it.  
23 Furthermore, my observations of and studies in Chinese  
24 political affairs came to convince me that with the  
25 gradual awakening of the Chinese people the recovery



1 of her national rights would be the natural course  
2 of development in China. So it was my basic con-  
3 ception of the Sino-Japanese relations that Japan  
4 should endeavor to bring about order and stability  
5 of East Asia by assisting and cooperating with the  
6 New China represented by the Nationalist Party,  
7 on terms of equality.

8 . "Regarding the Soviet Union, I thought that  
9 the Russian people were perfectly free to live under  
10 any government they chose, though the dictatorial and  
11 totalitarian form of government was not palatable to  
12 me. However, I felt no small disquietude, especially  
13 over those activities of the Third International,  
14 then generally believed to have been conducted under  
15 the guidance of the Soviet Union, which aided and  
16 abetted the subversive and revolutionary movements  
17 in East Asia, especially in Japan. Those aspects  
18 of the Japanese Communist movement which advocated  
19 the abolition of the Emperor-system by revolutionary  
20 methods and which discredited all religion through  
21 Marxian materialistic philosophy were especially  
22 abhorrent to me. On the other hand, for preventing  
23 the communistic revolution in Japan I considered  
24 it essential that Japanese statesmen adopt measures  
25 that the livelihood of the people be more adequately

1 guaranteed.

2 "I was well aware from my knowledge of his-  
3 tory that war between major powers would bring great  
4 national disasters whatever the outcome of the war.  
5 I therefore believed that a war between Japan and the  
6 Soviet Union should be avoided by all means. I  
7 thought that the sine qua non for the maintenance of  
8 peace between the two countries were (1) that the  
9 Soviet Union cease to support the Third International  
10 in the Far East, and (2) that competition in armaments  
11 between the two nations be terminated. It was also  
12 my favorite theory that in order to liquidate the  
13 mutual distrust and feelings of menace it was not  
14 enough to conclude non-aggression treaties which  
15 might easily be scrapped but it was necessary for  
16 both nations to express sincerity in pacific inten-  
17 tions by adopting such practical measures as: (1)  
18 the withdrawal by Japan of troops stationed in Man-  
19 churia and Korea; and (2) the withdrawal of troops  
20 by the Soviet Union of troops east of Baikal. How-  
21 ever, I had to recognize that my ideas could not, in  
22 view of the prevailing circumstances, such as the  
23 activities of the Third International, readily be  
24 realized, and that so long as the Soviet Union in-  
25 creased her armament in the Far East, Japan must also



1 make ample provision for any eventuality, although  
2 meticulous care must be employed by Japan to avoid  
3 conflict.

4 "Vis a vis Great Britain and the United  
5 States, which I regarded as militarily one and inseparable, I was convinced that Japan should keep on  
6 the most friendly terms with them and that she should  
7 never make them our enemy unless indeed we are militarily  
8 attacked or placed under an immediate menace of  
9 attack. This was, I thought, a matter of course  
10 even looked at solely from the standpoint of our national  
11 defence, in view of the fact that a serious  
12 potential danger lay in the North.

14 "The Nazi conception of dictatorial and  
15 totalitarian government was not in harmony with my  
16 political views any more than that of the Soviet  
17 Union. I had a high regard for many excellent traits  
18 of the German people, but my political sympathy was  
19 not with the Hitlerite Germany. I was strongly  
20 opposed to the proposed conclusion of the Triple  
21 Alliance, and especially so as Germany was then at  
22 war with Great Britain, with which country we must  
23 keep on friendly terms. I was then only a Section  
24 Chief of the China Affairs Board and certainly not  
25 in a position officially to express any views on such

1 matters. However, I told my private opinion about  
2 August 1940 to my old friend Prince KONOYE when he  
3 organized the Second KONOYE Cabinet, but then the  
4 rough outlines of policy had almost been determined,  
5 and it was not possible for me to move him. After I  
6 became Minister without Portfolio in the KONOYE  
7 Cabinet, I found that the Triple Alliance was one of  
8 the serious obstacles to the conclusion of the Ameri-  
9 can-Japanese negotiations.

10 "After the outbreak of the German-Soviet war,  
11 therefore, I presented my opinion to Prince KONOYE  
12 that it would be better to terminate the Triple  
13 Alliance by reason of the gross German perfidy toward  
14 its Far Eastern Ally. The Premier told me that he  
15 would consult the Foreign, Army, and Navy Ministers  
16 about it, but my suggestion made to KONOYE was not  
17 realized through sturdy opposition shown by Foreign  
18 Minister MATSUOKA.

19 "(4) During the period covered by the Indict-  
20 ment my status was that of a military officer until  
21 I became a civilian by being appointed to the presi-  
22 dency of the Planning Board. However, the offices  
23 of the Cabinet Investigator and the Chief of the  
24 Political Section of the China Affairs Board were  
25 civilian in character, though I did not forfeit my



1 military status by assuming them.

2 "During 1931 and the ensuing years when I  
3 served at the Bureau of Military Affairs in the War  
4 Ministry, I was much concerned over the subversive  
5 renovation movements of young officers. My endeavor  
6 outside of my regular duties during that period was  
7 therefore directed toward the maintenance of dis-  
8 cipline within the army. I tried to dissuade such  
9 young officers as came to see me, tendering my advice  
10 to my superior to keep vigilant eyes on and to provide  
11 proper guidance for them. I explained the condition  
12 in the army to KIDO and HARADA, secretaries to Count  
13 MAKINO and Prince SAIONJI respectively, with a desire  
14 that the situation be wisely dealt with under the  
15 guidance of these farsighted and experienced states-  
16 men.

17 "(5) During my services in Manchuria, one in  
18 1936-1937 as Regional Commander at Tongning and  
19 another in 1938 as Chief of Staff of the Third Army  
20 at Mutangiang, incidents on the Manchurian-Siberian  
21 border were, so to speak, the order of the day. I  
22 feared that those minor incidents might develop into  
23 a major conflict between the two countries. So during  
24 my service at Tongning I devised a plan of my own  
25 to obviate them. I fixed an operational boundary-line

1 two to four kilometers inside the treaty boundary-  
2 line and ordered my men never to resort to force  
3 unless the operational boundary-line was invaded.  
4 So on the boundary with the defense of which I was  
5 charged there was not a single instance of conflict.  
6 In view of this success of my plan at that time,  
7 when I became Chief of Staff of the Third Army I per-  
8 suaded the Commander of the army, YAMADA, Otozo to  
9 adopt the same plan. On the boundary with the defense  
10 of which the Third Army was held responsible not a  
11 single case of border incident took place during my  
12 service.

13 "(6) The China Incident commenced in North  
14 China during my stay in Tongning. I deeply deplored  
15 such developments, but as a Regional Commander in the  
16 remote corners of Eastern Manchuria, I could do noth-  
17 ing but watch the situation with great anxiety for  
18 the future.

19 "Then I was called back to Tokyo at the end  
20 of 1938 to occupy the post of Chief of the Political  
21 Section of the China Affairs Board, the broad out-  
22 lines of our policy relative to the China Incident  
23 had already been decided upon by the High Command and  
24 the government. Many features of the above policy  
25 were diametrically opposed to my fundamental ideas on



1 China, and were of such nature as could not be approved  
2 by me in the light of my knowledge of Chinese affairs.  
3 As a Section Chief of the China Affairs Board, I had  
4 to execute the duties assigned to me within the frame-  
5 work of such a policy. However, I did my very best to  
6 deal with matters falling within my purview in a way  
7 which was most consonant with my convictions, so that  
8 the broader national policy itself might in due course  
9 of time so transform itself in practice as would be  
10 in harmony with my basic ideas. So I set about my  
11 task with the following principles as my personal  
12 guide: (1) cooperation between the Chinese and Japa-  
13 nese nations on terms of equality; (2) the security  
14 of the Chinese inhabitants in the war-stricken areas;  
15 and (3) respect for the rights and interests of the  
16 Powers in China.

17 "Thus my efforts were so directed that the  
18 Chinese property under the control of the Enemy  
19 Property Custodian be returned to its respective  
20 owners, that interference of the Japanese in the  
21 political affairs of the Chinese regimes be minimized.  
22 I did my best also to have the freedom of navigation  
23 in the Yangtze River by the Powers be restored. How-  
24 ever, these policies even if decided upon by the  
25 central authorities along the lines toward which I

1 endeavored was not speedily realized by reason of  
2 local conditions, especially of operational require-  
3 ments. The establishment of new regimes in China was  
4 of course incompatible with my basic ideas regarding  
5 Chinese affairs, but it had been a fixed policy over  
6 which I had no control. I worked, however, on the  
7 hypotheses that such was but a temporary phenomenon  
8 in the course of military operations, which would  
9 cease to exist if the hostilities came to an end,  
10 and that the early termination of hostilities and  
11 the restoration of peace between the two countries  
12 was the one thing needful for restoring Chinese  
13 politics to run their natural course.



1           "(7) In April 1941 Prince KONOYE asked me to  
2 accept the post of the Presidency of the Planning Board,  
3 saying that the Cabinet had decided to make both the  
4 Minister for Commerce and Industry and the President  
5 of the Planning Board to resign. Personally I was  
6 then reluctant to leave my military career by accepting  
7 such an offer. But since I was told by my old friend  
8 Prince KONOYE that he as the Prime Minister would be  
9 placed in an awkward predicament in case I declined  
10 the offer, I finally gave my consent to the appointment.

11           "Thus, on April 4, 1941, when after having  
12 been promoted to Lieutenant General, I retired from  
13 military service and was appointed Minister Without  
14 Portfolio and concurrently President of the Planning  
15 Board. The precedent for conferring on the Planning  
16 Board President, the status of Minister, had been set  
17 from the time of my predecessor. Because of this  
18 status I was privileged to attend cabinet meetings,  
19 but I understood that my primary function lay in the  
20 execution of the business of the Planning Board under  
21 the control of the Prime Minister, as provided in  
22 the Organization of the Planning Board.

23           "(9) The first task that confronted me upon  
24 my assumption of the presidency of the Planning Board  
25 was the drawing up of a commodity mobilization plan,

1 or plan for allocation of vital materials, for the  
2 fiscal year 1941. This plan had already been initiated  
3 some time earlier in the year before I assumed this office.  
4 This plan was to have been completed by the end of March,  
5 and put in operation April 1st. But because of divergence  
6 of views among the various ministries concerned, no  
7 decision had been reached before I was appointed to  
8 the Planning Board. When I was appointed President  
9 of the Planning Board, Prime Minister KONOYE said to  
10 me: 'It may be quite natural that in view of the  
11 current international situation, demands made by the  
12 armed forces should become all the more insistent.  
13 However, the national economic life is now much strained  
14 after four years of the China Incident. I wish that  
15 you would perform your work with that in mind.' I  
16 understood that I was especially chosen, not blindly  
17 to comply with the exorbitant demands then made by the  
18 Army and the Navy, but to see that the allocation of  
19 vital commodities be made in such way as not to exhaust  
20 the very sources of the nation's economic power through  
21 over-concentration on the production of munitions and  
22 to secure the nation's cultural life as much as possible.  
23 Accordingly, I established an organ in the Planning Board  
24 concerned exclusively with the necessities of life, and  
25 initiated a special plan for mobilizing such commodities,



1 apart from the general Commodities Mobilization Plan.  
2 And, I endeavored to adjust the demands of the various  
3 Ministries from this broader viewpoint.

4 "Then, from the end of June, I was confronted  
5 with two events of major importance. One of them was  
6 the German-Soviet War, rendering it impossible for Japan  
7 to obtain special steel, machine tools and other items  
8 which we had planned to import from Germany via Siberia.  
9 The other was the sending of Japanese troops to southern  
10 French Indo-China in July, which brought in its wake  
11 the economic blockade of Japan by America, Great Britain  
12 and other countries, cutting off our anticipated supply  
13 of scrap iron, petroleum, fertilizers, and other vital  
14 commodities. From this time on I was compelled, as a  
15 matter of my official business, to feel a special concern  
16 over the Japanese-American negotiation.

17 "(9) I cannot recollect having attended the  
18 Imperial Presence Conference of July 2, 1941. But I  
19 remember having heard from Prime Minister KONOYE toward  
20 the end of June -- very likely June 30 -- that our troops  
21 might be despatched to southern French Indo-China. For  
22 fear lest such a move should lead to a situation  
23 aggravating Japanese-American relations and adding another  
24 obstacle to the formulation of our commodity mobilization  
25 plan, which was already beset with many difficulties, I

1 voiced my view that it would be a serious matter if  
2 we should ever be subjected to an economic embargo.  
3 The Prime Minister said that the step was imperative  
4 in order to ward off an immediate danger of a war with  
5 the Soviet Union. Inasmuch as the step was not directed  
6 against America or Britain, Americans would understand  
7 if we fully explained our purpose. Unfortunately, what  
8 I had feared became a fact. Japan found herself  
9 economically isolated from America, Britain, the  
10 Netherlands, and other Powers. We were obliged now to  
11 redraft our commodity mobilization plan in accordance  
12 with the new situation. Thus, our commodity mobilization  
13 plan, sanctioned by the Cabinet meeting on August 22, 1941,  
14 was formulated so as to ensure self supply and self  
15 sufficiency as much as possible in respect of vital  
16 commodities, with a view to guaranteeing the security  
17 of national livelihood as well as to preserve the people's  
18 sense of security with regard to national defense.

19           "(10) However, while I thus tried to effect a  
20 compromise between the ministries and to draw up a  
21 commodity mobilization plan of a sort, I keenly realized  
22 that Japanese economy, which had depended for so many  
23 years on foreign trade, would be ruined if kept isolated  
24 for any extended period. So I asked the Prime Minister  
25 for the readjustment of the Japanese-American relations



1 and recommended that steps be taken in such a way as  
2 would bring about the lifting of the embargo. The Prime  
3 Minister told me that his mind was made up to confer  
4 personally with the President of the United States and  
5 to arrive at a speedy settlement through direct negoti-  
6 ation. I earnestly hoped that the Prime Minister's  
7 determination would bear fruit, restoring Japanese-  
8 American relations to normal as soon as possible.  
9 Unhappily, the views of the Prime Minister proved  
10 unacceptable to America, while within Japan the opinion  
11 was brought to the fore that as long as the United States  
12 refused to sell us the needed commodities we were com-  
13 pelled to take by force of arms the areas containing  
14 such resources. This, I conceived, put the Prime Minister  
15 in an extremely difficult position.

16           "(11) In August, 1941 I was ordered by Prime  
17 Minister KONOYE to study three problems. The first  
18 problem was: Can Japan provide herself with needed  
19 materials without relying upon America and Britain? My  
20 answer was 'No.' I stated that there was no possibility  
21 of Japan's become self-sustaining. The second problem  
22 was: Supposing that the severance of economic relations  
23 was to continue, would Japan be able to stand it for its  
24 duration? I reported that the severance of economic  
25 relations would put Japanese economy in an extremely  
difficult condition, but as long as no further special

1 development occurred in Japanese-American relations, we  
2 could rely on our stockpiles, excepting petroleum and a  
3 few other items, so that we might escape a collapse for  
4 a year and a half, or possibly two years. I added that  
5 in the case of such commodities as petroleum, for which  
6 the manufacture of substitutes was possible, we might be  
7 more or less self-sustaining after some years, provided  
8 that capital and materials were permitted to be thrown  
9 into those channels. The third problem was: Supposing  
10 war broke out and we succeeded in taking the oil-producing  
11 areas of the Netherlands East Indies, would we then be  
12 able to obtain the needed petroleum? I reported that  
13 immediate acquisition of the petroleum would be impossible  
14 because military occupation would necessarily be attended  
15 with serious destruction.

16       "(12) About the end of August, 1941, when the  
17 effects of the economic severance became patent, Prime  
18 Minister KONOYE ordered me to attend the Liaison Confer-  
19 ence. He did so that I might acquaint myself with the  
20 atmosphere of the Liaison Conference, which would be  
21 helpful in exacting my work connected with the administra-  
22 tion of national economic power, and also to make replies  
23 to questions, if any, regarding economic problems. As I  
24 thought that the extent of my statement allowable at the  
25 Conference depended on my status, I asked the Prime



1 Minister regarding the nature of the Liaison Conference  
2 and my status therein. In accordance with an agreement  
3 relative to the Liaison Conference between the General  
4 Headquarters and the Government (exhibit 1103, page  
5 10,171 of the record), the Prime Minister explained to  
6 me in the following tenor:

7           "(a) 'Persons who always attend the meetings  
8 of the Liaison Conference are the Prime Minister, the  
9 Foreign Minister, the two Chiefs of Staff, and the War  
10 and Navy Ministers. Regarding other Ministers, they  
11 will be asked by the Prime Minister to attend when deemed  
12 necessary by the latter. When your presence is required,  
13 you will receive orders from me or you will be notified  
14 thereof by the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. You are  
15 to attend the Conference as president of the Planning  
16 Board, and I hope you will bear that in mind when you  
17 are asked to speak at the Conference.'

18           "I interpreted these words of the Premier to  
19 mean that I was to attend the Conference as the Premier's  
20 technical assistant and that I must refrain from speaking  
21 except by order or with the consent of the Prime Minister.

22           "(b) 'Even if an understanding has been reached  
23 between the General Headquarters and the Government, the  
24 execution must be postponed until after the approval of  
25 the Cabinet has been obtained. If, however, any matter

1 is within the sole purview of a Minister present at the  
2 Conference, which can be executed under his own responsi-  
3 bility, I think he can forthwith carry it out without  
4 referring the matter to the Cabinet.'

5 "I interpreted these words of the Premier to  
6 mean that the Liaison Conference was not a policy-deciding  
7 body existing over and above the Cabinet, but that it  
8 was a meeting convened with a view to reaching an under-  
9 standing through an exchange of views as between the  
10 Government and the General Headquarters.

11 "The Liaison Conference was sometimes convened  
12 in the presence of His Majesty. I understood that the  
13 Imperial Presence Conference was a kind of Liaison  
14 Conference, and not in any way different in character  
15 from the latter, although weighty matters alone were  
16 brought before it. I understood also that my status  
17 thereat was exactly the same as at the Liaison Conference.

18 "(13) By order of the Prime Minister, I attended  
19 the Imperial Presence Conference of September 6, 1941.  
20 I presume that it was the intention of the Prime Minister  
21 to have me speak before the meeting in case there arose  
22 any occasion requiring elucidation on economic matters.  
23 But at the conference on that day I was not called on to  
24 speak. Moreover, I was a little relieved to know that  
25 the topic of discussion for the day really centered on



1 the continuation of the negotiation with America, war  
2 preparations having been considered only as a safeguard  
3 against a really remote danger.  
4

5 "(14) After the September 6 Conference I was  
6 requested directly by the Navy Vice-Minister for an  
7 additional allocation of 300,000 tons of steel. At  
8 about the same time the Director of the Equipment Bureau  
9 of the War Ministry also asked me for more steel. I  
10 refused these requests. Both ministries, especially  
11 the Navy, repeated their demands, setting forth, how-  
12 ever, different figures each time for their requirements.  
13 The question was left pending until the war was actually  
14 decided upon.  
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24 invited the Ministers  
25 to his private residence at Ogikubo for a frank  
change of views. I was also present at this conference,

SUZUKI

DIRECT

35,205

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

ACTING PRESIDENT: Mr. Levin.

- - -

TEIICHI SUZUKI, an accused, resumed the  
stand and testified through Japanese interpreters  
as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, I continue with  
the presentation of the evidence on behalf of SUZUKI.

(Reading): "(15) Meanwhile October set in  
and I could see how hard pressed the Prime Minister was,  
with time running out. One day early in October he  
told me that he would like to withdraw from politics  
and become a monk. I said that it was too irresponsible  
of him to entertain such a notion. Then I told him  
that it might be advisable to have heart-to-heart  
talks with the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers.

"(16) On October 12 the Prime Minister  
invited the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs  
to his private residence at Ogikubo for a frank ex-  
change of views. I was also present at this conference,

Greenberg & Yelden



1 having been directed to make a record of its pro-  
2 ceedings. On the question of withdrawal of the armed  
3 forces from China, there arose a sharp difference  
4 of views between the Premier and the War Minister,  
5 so that the meeting was adjourned without having  
6 reached any conclusion, all matters being reserved  
7 for further study.

8 "It became quite clear as the result of this  
9 conference where the thorny question lay. The Navy  
10 really thought that the war with America was impossible  
11 but did not desire openly to say so.

12 "The Army did not necessarily desire war,  
13 but vigorously objected to the withdrawal of troops  
14 from China. The Foreign Minister was firmly of the  
15 opinion that without consenting to the withdrawal of  
16 the armed forces from China, the negotiations with  
17 America offered no prospect of success. The only way  
18 for the Prime Minister to avoid war was, therefore,  
19 either to make the Navy formally declare its real  
20 intentions, or to make the Army understand the un-  
21 expressed intentions of the Navy and agree to the  
22 withdrawal of the armed forces. I saw that the Prime  
23 Minister was in a predicament, because personally he  
24 felt himself unequal to the task either of persuading  
25 the Navy or the Army.

1 "I thought that the predicament in which  
2 the Prime Minister was placed was due to the decision  
3 of the Imperial Presence Conference of September 6.  
4 After the conference, therefore, I asked the Prime  
5 Minister if it was not advisable, in the light of the  
6 discussions of the day, to request the Throne to wipe  
7 the September 6 decision off the slate and continue  
8 the negotiation with America. He replied that as that  
9 conference was in any case an informal one, such a  
10 proposition would be feasible, if he asked. He ordered  
11 me to talk over the matter thoroughly with the War  
12 Minister. So on the following day (October 13) I went  
13 to the War Minister and submitted the proposition. He  
14 said that to cancel the decision of the Imperial  
15 Presence Conference within the brief space of one  
16 month and to wipe it off the slate was a grave matter  
17 for which both the Government and the High Command had  
18 to assume responsibility, and he could not, therefore,  
19 agree to the proposition, which could be carried out  
20 only if and when the Government and the High Command  
21 leaders had been replaced. When I conveyed this view  
22 of the War Minister to the Premier, the latter said he  
23 would discuss the matter afresh with the former on the  
24 following day. On the evening of the same day I  
25 visited Marquis KIDO and stressed the necessity of



requesting the Emperor to nullify the September 6

1 Imperial Presence Conference to enable the diplomatic  
2 negotiations to be continued.

3           "(17) Now at the cabinet meeting of October  
4 14 the War Minister abruptly spoke declaring that he  
5 was opposed to the withdrawal of troops from China  
6 and that the negotiation with America should be broken  
7 off. This unexpected declaration of the War Minister  
8 so surprised the Prime Minister and all the members of  
9 the Cabinet that the meeting was adjourned without  
10 any one uttering a word. Late in the afternoon I was  
11 called up by the Prime Minister, who enjoined me as  
12 follows:  
13

14           "'From the attitude of the War Minister, as  
15 revealed today, the negotiation with America is impos-  
16 sible. If that is impossible, the Cabinet can do  
17 nothing but resign en bloc, and as this resignation is  
18 due to the War Minister's attitude, I want you to go  
19 and sound him about his views on the disposition of  
20 the political situation after the resignation. I have  
21 to inform His Majesty concerning the post-resignation  
22 prospects.'

23           "Toward the evening I called on the War  
24 Minister at his official residence and conveyed him  
25 the Prime Minister's words, whereupon the War Minister

spoke:

1            "'I do not like to discuss in private a  
2 subject which is a matter of Imperial prerogative.  
3 But since you ask me, I will say this. I believe  
4 there is no one but His Imperial Highness Prince  
5 HIGASHIKUNI who can save the situation of today. I  
6 spoke about this to Marquis KIDO when we met the other  
7 day.'

8            "The reply of the War Minister was to me  
9 rather unexpected. For I had often heard that Prince  
10 HIGASHIKUNI had expressed his ardent desire for the  
11 success of Japanese-American negotiations and granted  
12 words of encouragement to the Prime Minister to do his  
13 level best for attaining the worthy object. Late in  
14 the evening I conveyed to Prince KONOYE the words of  
15 the War Minister. Greatly elated, the Prince said:

17            "'That is splendid. His Highness is definitely  
18 opposed to war. He has time and again wished me suc-  
19 cess in our negotiations with America. I intend to  
20 speak to His Majesty to obtain Imperial approval.  
21 However, please communicate the views of TOJO and  
22 myself at once to KIDO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.'

23            "(18) On the following morning (October 15)  
24 at about 9 o'clock, I called on Marquis KIDO at his  
25 private residence, and explained to him all that



1 occurred on the previous day. The Marquis said:

2 "It is not customary to install a member  
3 of the Imperial family as the head of a cabinet. Then  
4 there seems to be a group of men in the army who would  
5 make their way into war under premiership of His  
6 Highness. So I will think it over carefully."

7 "I reported to Prince KONOYE what Marquis  
8 KIDO said. Then, a little later the Marquis tele-  
9 phoned and I called on him again. He said:

10 "Please go to the War Minister and ask if  
11 he can hold down the army's war faction if His Highness  
12 heads the Government and decides against war."

13 "I visited the War Minister and put to him  
14 Marquis KIDO's question. The Minister said:

15 "If His Highness heads the Government and  
16 decides on a no-war policy, and if it cannot check  
17 the Army, under whose premiership can it be checked?  
18 But I myself can't say just now whether it can be  
19 checked or it cannot be checked."

20 "I transmitted to Marquis KIDO these words  
21 of the War Minister just as he has said them.

22 "(19) Early in the morning the next day, the  
23 16th, I was called by Prince KONOYE and given the  
24 following errand. He said:

25 "I had an audience with His Highness Prince

1 HIGASHIKUNI last night. I pleaded with His Highness  
2 that, in the event the Imperial Command to form a  
3 cabinet should come to him, he would by all means  
4 accept it and use his endeavors toward the adjustment  
5 of our relations with America. The Prince said that  
6 it was a serious matter, on which he would like to  
7 consult with the War Minister and the Navy Minister,  
8 and he would like to have two or three days to think  
9 it over. It seems that His Highness was not necessarily  
10 disinclined to accept. Now I believe it advisable  
11 that he should be first informed of the nation's  
12 strength from the President of the Planning Board.  
13 So you will go now to His Highness and offer explana-  
14 tions as you see fit.'

15 "I immediately proceeded to the residence of  
16 the Prince, and explained to His Highness for about  
17 an hour about the actual state of our national strength,  
18 using the 1941 Commodity Mobilization Plan as the  
19 central theme. And I spoke on the need of a satis-  
20 factory settlement of the American negotiation.

21 "His Highness expressed his agreement to my  
22 remarks and said to me that war must be avoided by all  
23 means.

24 "After leaving the Prince's residence, I  
25 called on Marquis KIDO and made a detailed report to



1 him as to what had transpired since the previous day.  
2 He expressed his fears that the assumption of premier-  
3 ship by a prince of the Imperial family might create  
4 undesirable impressions both abroad and at home, that  
5 there was nobody among His Majesty's subjects who  
6 could shoulder the responsibility. However, he did  
7 not positively say to me that he was opposed to the  
8 formation of a cabinet by a prince of the Imperial  
9 blood. In the afternoon the Prime Minister said to  
10 me:

11 "As regards the premiership of the Prince,  
12 I have had word from the Lord Keeper of the Privy  
13 Seal to the effect that it has been decided not to  
14 request the Prince to head the Government. So the  
15 matter is dropped. I suppose Marquis KIDO has some  
16 idea. The Cabinet will resign en bloc at once."

17 "Accordingly, I tendered also my letter of  
18 resignation.

19 "(20) On the following day, the 17th, I  
20 visited Prince KONOYE at his private residence to  
21 thank him for the kindness shown to me while I was in  
22 office and was engaged in a desultory chat, when the  
23 Prince said to me substantially as follows:

24 "Marquis KIDO has telephoned me that TOJO  
25 is to form a cabinet. At the same time, he is to

1 receive word from His Majesty to carry on the  
2 American negotiation, wiping the September 6 decision  
3 off the slate. Accordingly, TOJO will, I believe,  
4 check the war action and proceed with the American  
5 negotiation. So, you will do well to remain in  
6 office and help him, in case he asks you to do so.  
7 If the new cabinet comprises many members of my  
8 cabinet, it will show that the new cabinet desires  
9 to carry on the negotiations for peaceful settlement  
10 of the difficulties between Japan and the United  
11 States.'

12 "When I was asked by Prime Minister TOJO  
13 to continue in my office, I consented in conformity  
14 to the foregoing advice of Prince KONOYE, seeing that  
15 many of my colleagues in the KONOYE Cabinet also  
16 remained in office.

17 "(21) My status in the TOJO Cabinet was the  
18 same as in the KONOYE Cabinet, viz., Minister without  
19 Portfolio and concurrently President of the Planning  
20 Board. However, there was considerable difference in  
21 practice. For since Prince KONOYE was my close  
22 friend of long standing, I volunteered my opinion to  
23 him on some political matters and the Prime Minister  
24 himself asked my opinion for his reference and indeed  
25 sometimes employed me to conduct certain political



1 negotiations. Premier TOJO, however, gave me a  
2 warning at the very beginning of my entry in his  
3 Cabinet to the following effect. 'It is my desire  
4 that you concentrate your energy on the work of econom-  
5 ic mobilization and not to meddle in political  
6 affairs. You should especially keep in mind that  
7 the President of the Planning Board is to function  
8 under the control of the Prime Minister.' Therefore,  
9 I endeavored to comply with his wishes and devoted my-  
10 self to the work of the Planning Board.

1           "(22) The attitude of General TOJO after he  
2 became Prime Minister was decidedly different from  
3 that assumed by him in the last days of the KONOYE  
4 Cabinet. In order to continue the diplomatic negotia-  
5 tion by wiping the September 6 decision off the slate,  
6 he decided to investigate various questions. In this  
7 investigation I was assigned, at the end of October,  
8 1941, the following two questions, on which I reported  
9 to the Prime Minister the conclusions of the Planning  
10 Board arrived at after consultation and joint study with  
11 the Ministries concerned, vis., the War, Navy, Commerce  
12 and Industry, Agriculture and Forestry, and Communica-  
13 tions Ministries.

14           "Question (A). If the American-Japanese  
15 negotiations should be broken off, and no prospect  
16 exists for the termination of the economic severance,  
17 to what extent may Japan maintain her supply of commod-  
18 ities?

19           "The report of the Planning Board was that  
20 the answer would depend on the descriptions of commod-  
21 ities, to wit:

22           "First, regarding commodities available in  
23 Japan proper, Manchuria and China, some increase would  
24 be feasible. In respect of steel, the 4,700,000 tons  
25 expected to be produced during the fiscal year 1941,



1 might annually be increased by approximately 200,000  
2 tons.

3 "Second, regarding commodities to be imported  
4 from Indo-China and Thailand, a decrease due to Ameri-  
5 can and British interference must be expected. This  
6 had to be taken into account in view of the fact that  
7 in 1941 when Japan sought to purchase rice from Thai-  
8 land, she was forestalled by previous British pur-  
9 chases. However, since the extent of such interfer-  
10 ence was unforeseeable, the report did not contain the  
11 amount to be decreased.

12 "Third, regarding commodities to be imported  
13 from America, Great Britain and the Netherlands, es-  
14 pecially the petroleum, the prospect was anything but  
15 bright. The annual domestic production of petroleum  
16 did not exceed 400,000 tons, while civilian consump-  
17 tion amounted annually to about 1,800,000 tons. The  
18 amount then stored by the Army and Navy, as was di-  
19 vulged to the Planning Board for the first time, did  
20 not exceed 8,400,000 tons, and the amount of petroleum  
21 stored in the civilian circles had been nearly ex-  
22 hausted then. If the petroleum stored by the mili-  
23 tary was to be employed for civilian purposes as well,  
24 it would be exhausted however economized within a  
25 space of three years. Moreover, a prospect for arti-

1        ficial petroleum production was by no means bright.  
2        The construction of artificial petroleum factories  
3        with a capacity for producing 5,000,000 tons annually,  
4        which had been the amount of peacetime imports, would  
5        involve a great quantity of materials and could not  
6        speedily be realized. It could not certainly meet  
7        the urgent needs.

8                "Question (B). If Japan should succeed in  
9        the event of war, in occupying the natural resources  
10       zones in the southern regions without serious damage,  
11       how far could self-supply be expected?

12               "As in the question (a) the answer of the  
13       Planning Board depended on the kinds of commodities,  
14       to wit:

15               "First, if war with America were to break out,  
16       requisitions would have to be effected of an enormous  
17       amount of bottom, and certain losses  
18       of ships must be taken into account. According to the  
19       estimates reported to the Planning Board by the War  
20       and Navy Ministries, continuous employment of 3,000,000  
21       tons of ocean-going vessels was feasible for trans-  
22       port between the raw material zones and the processing  
23       and productive areas. If, however, these vessels were  
24       to be not only for transport to and from Manchuria and  
25       China, but also for that between the homeland and the



1 Netherlands East Indies, it would necessitate strict  
2 economy in the carriage of goods, resulting in some  
3 diminution in commodities production. In regard to  
4 steel, the maintenance of an annual supply of  
5 4,500,000 tons could hardly be expected. It might  
6 well diminish to the level of 4,300,000 tons.

7 "Second, imports from French Indo-China and  
8 Thailand and especially rice would be reduced consid-  
9 erably by reason of military operations. The rice  
10 shortage thereby created would have to be made good by  
11 substitutes such as sweet-potatoes. This might cause  
12 no small internal disquietude.

13 "Third, with regard to imports from the south-  
14 ern areas, especially the petroleum, the estimate could  
15 not be made by the Planning Board.

16 "Inasmuch as the petroleum was one of the  
17 strategic commodities, the petroleum questions apart  
18 from those relating to domestic production and civilian  
19 requirements were studied by the War and Navy Minist-  
20 ries not allowing any participation by the Planning  
21 Board nor by any other Ministry for that matter. This  
22 state of destruction or repairs of the oil fields  
23 installations again was closely related to the condi-  
24 tion of military operations of which the Planning Board  
25 had no knowledge. Nor was the Planning Board aware of

1 the state of tankers or other means of transport. In  
2 regard to the petroleum, therefore, the Planning  
3 Board had to report, solely relying on the result of  
4 studies made by the Army and Navy, indicating that the  
5 report was exclusively based on the studies made by  
6 the Army and Navy. According to the above studies  
7 it was estimated that the petroleum obtainable in the  
8 first year would be about 300,000 tons and in the  
9 second year, approximately 2,000,000 tons, provided  
10 that the southern areas could be occupied after the  
11 outbreak of war.

12 "The contents of the report of the Planning  
13 Board suggested the fact that in case the Japanese-  
14 American negotiation unfortunately failed, then war  
15 or no war, Japanese economy would be overwhelmed with  
16 difficulties. It suggested that our economic life  
17 would be impoverished to the extent that the minimum  
18 living standard itself might seriously be jeopardized.  
19 The Prime Minister after ascertaining the views of the  
20 ministers responsible for the above report, namely,  
21 Ministers of Commerce and Industry, Agriculture and  
22 Forestry and Communications, and taking also other  
23 reports into account persuaded the High Command and  
24 decided to endeavor to bring about the successful  
25 conclusion of the American-Japanese negotiations.



1 And this policy was concretely manifested in the deci-  
2 sion of the Imperial Presence Conference of November  
3 5, which decided to withdraw the armed forces from  
4 China to make the negotiations successful.

5 "(23) On the other hand, the Prime Minister  
6 and the Foreign Minister seemed to be unable to totally  
7 disregard the vigorous demands made by the High Com-  
8 mand. The opinion of the High Command was substantial-  
9 ly as follows: When we reviewed the developments of  
10 the American-Japanese negotiation, the demands made  
11 upon us by the United States seemed to increase in  
12 proportion to the concessions made by Japan. No  
13 prospect was, therefore, in sight of the negotiation  
14 coming to any successful conclusion. This indicated  
15 that what the United States really had in view was not  
16 the amicable settlement of the China Affair, but the  
17 destruction of Japan as a leading power. If, there-  
18 fore, Japan should recognize in principle the with-  
19 drawal of the armed forces and also evince her readi-  
20 ness to enter into negotiations concerning the details  
21 for such withdrawal, and America should assume never-  
22 theless an attitude of evading the settlement, it  
23 might properly be concluded that the real intention  
24 of the United States was to gain time; and, that she  
25 intended, under the guise of continuing the negotiation

1 to strengthen her Far Eastern forces and, when fully  
2 armed, drop negotiations and turn to an offensive  
3 against Japan. If Japan were destined not to be able  
4 to avoid war with America, the earlier it came, the  
5 more advantageous it would be for Japan. Therefore,  
6 the diplomatic negotiations should be concluded by  
7 the end of November and if no prospect of success  
8 should be in sight at the beginning of December, the  
9 decision for war should then be made. As one reason  
10 for this contention the High Command pointed to the  
11 concentration of the air forces in Malaya and the  
12 Philippines, and the growing divergence in fighting  
13 power between the Allied forces and ours, and declared  
14 that after the lapse of several months the High Command  
15 could not be responsible for national defense.

16 "The Government, especially the Foreign  
17 Minister was putting up a stiff fight against the  
18 contentions of the High Command. The Liaison Con-  
19 ference of November 1 immediately preceding the  
20 Imperial Presence Conference of November 5 continued  
21 in deliberations far into the night and indeed until  
22 2 a.m. of November 2. The High Command had not  
23 relinquished its contentions until the very end. As  
24 the result, the Imperial Presence Conference of  
25 November 5 decided, on the one hand that diplomatic



1 negotiations without a moment's delay was the very  
2 thing to be done, and then again at the beginning of  
3 December we could further continue diplomatic negotia-  
4 tion, if American attitude allowed it. For, the  
5 conditions for conducting the Japanese-American  
6 negotiations were more favorable for settlement than  
7 at the time of the KONOYE Cabinet, by the recognition  
8 of the withdrawal of troops which had so far been  
9 vigorously opposed by the Army. Moreover, the troops  
10 which advanced into Southern Indo-China, which was  
11 the cause of the economic blockade, were to be with-  
12 drawn. Further, a preliminary agreement to decide  
13 on war might, in view of the precedent of the deci-  
14 sion of the September 6 Imperial Presence Conference,  
15 be rescinded. When I saw the above-mentioned agree-  
16 ment had been arrived at between the High Command and  
17 the Government, on November 5, I felt, therefore, not  
18 so much that war had become imminent, as that a new  
19 prospect of peace had arisen on our horizon.  
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1           "(24) However, this determination to con-  
2     tinue the Japanese-American negotiation, reached after  
3     all kinds of twists and turns, was nullified by the  
4     American reply of November 26. I was given the general  
5     purport of the note at the Liaison Conference of  
6     November 27 or 28. I heard also the Foreign Minister  
7     explain that the said note was tantamount to an ulti-  
8     matum. At the previous Liaison Conferences I had fre-  
9     quently heard the representatives of the General Head-  
10    quarters reporting on the strengthening of the British  
11    and American military preparations in the Pacific  
12    areas. Now being told that the American reply con-  
13    stituted virtually an ultimatum, I could not but  
14    sense that war with America might be unavoidable. The  
15    Liaison Conference of that day was adjourned. As for  
16    myself, I decided to abide by the final decision to be  
17    arrived at by consultation between the Prime Minister  
18    (who was also the War Minister) Ministers of the Navy  
19    and Foreign Affairs, and the Chiefs of the Army and  
20    Navy General Staffs.

21           "(25) On November 29 an informal conference  
22    between the government and senior statesmen was held  
23    at the Imperial Palace. I was directed by the Prime  
24    Minister together with the Navy, Foreign and Finance  
25    Ministers to attend the conference and to answer such



1 questions as might be put to the government regarding  
2 national economic strength. I did not, of course,  
3 volunteer any explanation. However, one of the elder  
4 statesmen -- I think it was Admiral OKADA -- asked a  
5 question concerning the shipbuilding capacity and the  
6 capacity for the production of airplanes in the event  
7 of war. To the former question I answered that the  
8 annual output would be between 700,000 and 800,000 tons.  
9 Regarding the latter question, I replied that materials  
10 were not available at the Planning Board since the  
11 matter fell within the sole purview of the military.  
12 Another question was also put by another senior states-  
13 man regarding the supply of steel, to which I made the  
14 reply that it would be between 4,300,000 and 4,500,000  
15 tons. The main theme of the conference, however, was  
16 the circumstances in which Japanese-American negotia-  
17 tions came to a deadlock. Most of the time was, there-  
18 fore, occupied with that subject and little time was  
19 left for me to enlarge on economic problems, nor did  
20 any senior statesman demand such elucidation.

21 "(26) The Prime Minister then seemed to have  
22 been finally determined to enter into war. At the  
23 Cabinet meeting on December 1, and before the Imperial  
24 Presence Conference on the same day, attended by all  
25 the Cabinet members, his conclusion to the following

effect was announced:

1           "War with America, Great Britain and the  
2 Netherlands is unavoidable. The Army and Navy will  
3 respectively turn to war operations. However, when  
4 we see a definite chance for success in negotiation,  
5 the war operations will immediately be suspended, and  
6 the government will turn to negotiation.'

7           "I myself agreed to the above decision, be-  
8 lieving that this was unavoidable as long as we had an  
9 American ultimatum.

10           "(27) Following the above-mentioned govern-  
11 ment decision, I was obliged to engage myself busily  
12 with the revision of the Commodity Mobilization Plan  
13 according to the requirements of the oncoming war.  
14 Although the preservation of the sense of security  
15 with regard to national defense was one of the objec-  
16 tives of the 1941 Material Mobilization Plan, it did  
17 not cover such a vast armament expansion as would be  
18 required for prosecuting a war with America and Britain.  
19 Economically Japan had not surely been prepared for  
20 any war with America and Britain prior to December 1,  
21 1941. Quick readjustments to meet the new situation  
22 demanded titanic efforts on my part. The plan had  
23 to be so revised that the allocation of military goods  
24 needed for war would be ensured, curtaining civilian  
25



needs to the minimum.

1           "For some time thereafter I concentrated all  
2 my energy on the performance of my duties, with hardly  
3 any time to spare to think of any other matter. Prior  
4 to December 1, 1941 I earnestly wished for and contrib-  
5 uted towards the avoidance of the American-Japanese  
6 war. However, once the national decision was made for  
7 war, I considered it my moral duty as a Japanese sub-  
8 ject to do my bit to collaborate in the prosecution  
9 of war.  
10

11           "(28) It was towards the evening of December  
12 7 that I was notified that there would be a cabinet  
13 meeting the next day (the 8th) at 7 o'clock in the  
14 morning. At about 6:30 a.m. on December 8th when I  
15 went to the Prime Minister's official residence to  
16 attend the cabinet meeting I was informed by the Chief  
17 Secretary of the Cabinet HOSHINO of the attack on  
18 Pearl Harbor and knew for the first time that the  
19 hostilities were commenced. At the cabinet meeting  
20 the Navy Minister gave a brief explanation of that  
21 operation, after which the Cabinet decided on the text  
22 of the Imperial Rescript declaring war.  
23

24           "(29) After as before the outbreak of war,  
25 my main duties as the President of the Planning Board  
consisted in the preparation of an effective plan for

1 commodity mobilization with the concurrence of the  
2 Ministries concerned, without any authority to compel  
3 them and without any power of the execution thereof.  
4 However, after the commencement of war the necessity  
5 for a unified administration of national economic  
6 power was gradually increased and various ministries  
7 came to accede more easily to the opinion of the  
8 Planning Board, and especially after the end of 1943  
9 the War and Navy Ministries themselves became less  
10 insistent in their respective demands. Thus the  
11 Planning Board, which functioned as a sort of concilia-  
12 tion board in the pre-war days, gradually came to command  
13 prestige with the progress of war. It did not cease  
14 to be a conciliation board, although the conciliators  
15 came to command more influence over the parties con-  
16 cerned. At the request of Premier TOJO, however, I  
17 left the cabinet as well as the post of the President  
18 of the Planning Board on October 8, 1943.

19 "PART II  
20

21 "In Part I of my affidavit I have made a gen-  
22 eral statement of facts concerning my case. During  
23 its rebuttal of my motion to dismiss, and on other  
24 occasions, the prosecution referred to certain evidence  
25 allegedly tending to prove that I had participated in  
a criminal conspiracy as alleged in the Indictment. I



1 beg, therefore, to make further elucidation of facts  
2 and circumstances relative to each item of the prose-  
3 cution's evidence.

4 "(30) Exhibit 179 (F), KIDO's Diary, August 7,  
5 1931, page 1927, Exhibit 179 (O), KIDO's Diary, October  
6 7, 1931, page 1941 of the record (illegal plans of  
7 young officers).

8 "Upon hearing about a plot, later called the  
9 March Affair, I reported the matter to Colonel NAGATA,  
10 Tetsuzan, my superior, with whom I collaborated to  
11 check the plot from being materialized.

12 "The March Affair after all did not come to  
13 pass. However, after this rumor of a plot had become  
14 current, an agitation became palpable among young  
15 officers attached to the regiments. Some of them not  
16 only discussed politics before their seniors, but  
17 went as far as to advocate a national renovation by  
18 military force. I admonitioned them against such  
19 reckless behavior whenever they talked in such a tone  
20 in my presence. I also presented my views to my super-  
21 iors to keep vigilant watch and to take care that  
22 junior officers might not be swayed by their youthful  
23 ardor to bring ruin on their own careers as well as  
24 cast reflections on the honor of the Army.

"This restlessness among young officers was

1 not, I thought, without its causes. One of the causes  
2 was that there was an apparent deterioration in poli-  
3 ticians' morals, corruption cases involving them having  
4 often been rumored. This naturally ired young offi-  
5 cers. Another cause was that economic depression  
6 having then been at its height, the number of the unem-  
7 ployed was steadily increasing. Also, soldiers hailing  
8 from the country-side had been conscripted from families  
9 in great financial distress. It seemed to me in a  
10 sense quite natural that commanders of sections or  
11 companies should come to have a deep sympathy for the  
12 state of their subordinates' families and to look  
13 forward to a government capable of saving the nation  
14 from such economic distress. Their advocacy of national  
15 renovation was due to these causes, I thought. In view  
16 of such circumstances I concluded that the military  
17 authorities were certainly in duty bound to exercise  
18 the strictest control over those subversive young offi-  
19 cers with the view of maintaining military discipline,  
20 but this alone might have the deleterious effect of in-  
21 tensifying their unexpressed resentment, unless the  
22 statesmen in power were pure and above corruption, and  
23 unless more effective measures were adopted to deal  
24 with the agrarian problems and to solve the problem  
25 of unemployment.



1 "Thus, from the standpoint of maintaining army  
2 discipline I was much concerned over the state of  
3 domestic politics. I remember having said to Marquis  
4 KIDO and Baron HARADA to the effect that a young and  
5 able statesman, such as Prince KONOYE, who was above  
6 all reproaches of corruption, should become Premier  
7 and form a coalition cabinet comprising party men of  
8 known moral rectitude, and that this would help in  
9 no small measure in maintaining and strengthening  
10 military discipline. And also a study of the agrarian  
11 problems brought me to the conclusion that greater  
12 protection of tenant rights and lower farm rents were  
13 even more necessary than the stabilization of the  
14 prices of rice. However, what I had primarily in mind,  
15 and spoke to others at the time, was the ways and  
16 means by which deterioration of military discipline  
17 might effectively be prevented, which was then my  
18 chief concern.

19 "(31) Exhibit 2252, KIDO's Diary, May 17, 1932,  
20 page 16,215 of Record (Re the succeeding cabinet).

21 "As I stated above, I presented my views to  
22 my superior officers that they should keep vigilant  
23 watch on young officers. On May 15, 1932, however, a  
24 deplorable incident occurred. A number of naval  
25 officers and several students of the Military Academy

1 in collaboration with civilian extremists assassinated  
2 Premier INUKAI. The War Ministry circles received a  
3 serious shock by this news. Among my colleagues a  
4 sentiment of self-reproach was expressed for the fact  
5 that several candidates for army officers should have  
6 been involved in such a plot. They said military  
7 discipline must be maintained so as to check the  
8 reoccurrence of a similar incident. A desire was  
9 also expressed in this connection that the succeeding  
10 cabinet be not organized by the Seiyukai Party, then  
11 so generally condemned for its lack of moral integrity,  
12 and that instead a coalition cabinet be formed by  
13 upright men so as to facilitate the maintenance of  
14 military discipline.

15 "When I met Marquis KIDO after the May 15  
16 incident, I gave him such information about the inci-  
17 dent as was available at the War Ministry and the  
18 views and desires then expressed by my colleagues at  
19 the Ministry. The passage in the Diary is, I suppose,  
20 a summary statement regarding our conversations at  
21 that time.

22  
23 "(32) Exhibit 2253, KIDO's Diary, April 13,  
24 1933, page 16,216 of Record (Describing Russia an  
25 absolute enemy, etc.)

"According to KIDO's Diary I am reported to



1 have said at a banquet at Marquis INOUE's residence  
2 that Russia was an absolute enemy and that I was opposed  
3 to the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with her.  
4 I do not well remember the occasion but possibly I  
5 may have stated something to the effect that so long  
6 as the Soviet Union aided and abetted the activities  
7 of the Third International, which plotted to effect a  
8 communistic revolution in Japan comprising the abolition  
9 of the Emperor system, the USSR was our absolute enemy,  
10 and that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact  
11 against such background, would be illusory.

12 "(33) Exhibit 3371, page 31,835 of Record,  
13 exhibit 670, page 7,330 (Re: My alleged speech at the  
14 Toyama School in 1933)

15 "I recollect that some time in 1933 War Minister  
16 ARAKI invited the governors to a luncheon party at the  
17 Toyama School to express his thanks for their services  
18 rendered as advisers to the Soldiers Assistance Society,  
19 a charitable organization having for its object assist-  
20 ance to be given to the families of indigent soldiers.  
21 I think General ARAKI made a brief speech before the  
22 luncheon thanking guests for their endeavors in that  
23 cause. I have not the slightest recollection that I  
24 ever made any speech myself at that meeting. I remember,  
25 however, that in the ante-chamber several maps of

1 Manchuria were hung on the wall indicating, e.g., the  
2 state of bandit soldiers in Manchuria, and I also re-  
3 member having explained the maps in answer to questions  
4 put by Count Kiyoura KEIGO, president of the society,  
5 and that he expressed his satisfaction with my explana-  
6 tions. I absolutely deny that I ever made at that  
7 meeting or elsewhere, any speech connoting the necessity  
8 of military occupation of Siberia. This allegation  
9 seems to me preposterous for such a bellicose idea  
10 is contrary to my concepts of national defense.

11 "(34) Exhibit 2266, KIDO's Diary, December  
12 29, 1938, page 16,232 of Record (KONOYE Cabinet should  
13 carry on, etc.)

14 "During the period extending from August,  
15 1936 to December, 1938 my official assignments were  
16 at Manchuria and Kyoto. At the end of 1938 I was  
17 appointed Chief of the Political Affairs Section of  
18 the China Affairs Board. Prince KONOYE was then Prime  
19 Minister, and I was to serve as one of his subordinates.  
20 Before hardly ten days had elapsed since my arrival  
21 in Tokyo, I was much disappointed to learn that the  
22 KONOYE Cabinet had made up its mind to resign en masse.  
23 For I thought that since the China Incident took place  
24 during the incumbency of Prince KONOYE, it was too  
25 irresponsible of him to leave his post as Premier



without the slightest prospect regarding its solution.

1 I, therefore, went to see my old friend Marquis KIDO  
2 and told him that the KONOYE Cabinet should carry on  
3 and do its level best to liquidate the China Incident.

4 "(35) 1939, Talks with Goette, page 3,780  
5 of Record.

6 "I remember that about September, 1939 two  
7 American newspaper correspondents came to see me at  
8 my office in the China Affairs Board (not at the Plan-  
9 ning Board). One of them asked my personal opinion  
10 about Wang Ching-wei. Personally I did not favor the  
11 government policy vis-a-vis the China Incident, and I  
12 told him frankly that the policy of our government to  
13 deal with Wang was illusory, for Generalissimo Chiang  
14 Kai-shek was the only real ruler in China. So I frankly  
15 said to him that hostilities must be terminated early  
16 by dealing with the Generalissimo. The above was my  
17 personal conviction at the time. I do not remember  
18 whether or not the newspaperman was named Mr. Goette.

20 "(36) Exhibit 1094, KIDO's Diary, June 23,  
21 1941, page 10,024 of Record (Re: Unification and  
22 reinforcement of the General Headquarters).

23 "I was appointed President of the Planning  
24 Board in April, 1941, and was charged with the prepara-  
25 tion of a Commodity Mobilization Plan. What troubled

me most in the performance of that duty was that the  
1 army and Navy separately and without any consultation  
2 with each other demanded allotments of commodities,  
3 and that antagonism prevailing between them made the  
4 preparation of the Commodity Mobilization Plan impossible.  
5 Moreover, both the Army and Navy kept its own secrets  
6 not only vis-a-vis the outside world but in relation to  
7 each other. There was much reason to doubt that two  
8 factories, of one and the same category, had been con-  
9 structed separately, while one factory would surely  
10 have been enough, and that the manufacture of muni-  
11 tions of war or studies and researches for their im-  
12 provement had been carried on without any connection  
13 with each other, thus involving no small waste of  
14 materials and labor. I was of the opinion that in order  
15 to obviate this palpable waste and to make maximum  
16 use of the materials which had been scanty in any  
17 event, it was imperative that the General Headquarters  
18 which had been divided into the water-light compart-  
19 ments in the shape of the Army and Navy Divisions be  
20 unified and a system be worked out under which the two  
21 could then collaborate under a unified command. I  
22 told this to Marquis KIDO who probably recorded the  
23 conversation in his Diary.  
24  
25



1           "(37) Exhibit 1107, page 10,140, page 10,216,  
2 page 10,333, page 10,518 of record; exhibit 1152, KIDO's  
3 Diary, October 29, 1941, page 10,314 of record. (Re:  
4 Attendance at Liaison Conferences).

5           "The Prosecution alleges that I attended the  
6 Imperial Presence Conferences of July 2, September 6,  
7 November 5, and December 1, 1941. I attended the last  
8 three conferences. With regard to the Imperial Presence  
9 Conference of July 2, 1941, however, I do not remember  
10 ever having attended it.

11           "I attended also many of the Liaison Confer-  
12 ences. However, there were conferences at which I did -  
13 not assist.

14           "(38) Exhibit 649, page 7,069 of record;  
15 exhibit 650, page 7,074; exhibit 1241, page 10,690  
16 of record; exhibit 1267, page 11,306 of record; (Re:  
17 Attendance at Privy Council meeting).

18           "I attended these meetings in the capacity of  
19 an explaining member. An explaining member has no  
20 right to vote (exhibit 83, Organization of the Privy  
21 Council and Rules Article II, latter part). The func-  
22 tions of an explaining member are to make such neces-  
23 sary explanations as may be ordered by the Minister in  
24 charge. The Prime Minister directed me to attend these  
25 meetings probably expecting that elucidations might

1 become necessary on matters falling under the juris-  
2 diction of the Planning Board.

3 "(39) Exhibit 840, page 8,403 and page 8,476  
4 of record; exhibit 1132, page 10,205; exhibit 1133, page  
5 10,214 of record; exhibit 1140, page 10,228 of record.  
6 (Re: Functions of the President of the Planning Board).

7 "The functions of the President of the Planning  
8 Board were provided for in the Organization of the Plan-  
9 ning Board, (Exhibit 71). At the time of my assumption  
10 of office, there was little work to do in the way of  
11 drafting the outlines of laws and ordinances. My time  
12 was mostly devoted to the adjustment or conciliation of  
13 conflicting claims of the various ministries. I have  
14 already referred to the 1941 Commodity Mobilization Plan  
15 in Part I of this affidavit and MAYAMA, Kanji formerly  
16 one of my subordinates, testified concerning the matter,  
17 (page 18,358 of record). Inasmuch as the prosecution  
18 makes certain allegations in reliance on a newspaper  
19 account which I deem entirely inadequate, I propose  
20 to offer further comments in addition to what has already  
21 been stated in Part I.

22 "As stated above, the 1941 Commodity Mobiliza-  
23 tion Plan and the ancillary Mobilization Plans relative  
24 to transport and labor were prepared under the most  
25 exacting circumstances: the outbreak of the Russo-German



1 war, involving a stoppage of imports from Germany  
2 and the economic severance effected by America, Britain,  
3 and the Netherlands. By reason of these events, Japan  
4 was confronted with the most brain-racking problems  
5 concerning the readjustment of her domestic economy  
6 which was placed in the most difficult circumstances.  
7 Through stoppage of the imports of petroleum not only  
8 from America but also from the Netherlands, the  
9 petroleum for civilian use was exhausted. The crude  
10 oil burners, buses, trucks and motor-ships (which latter  
11 had played an important role in domestic marine trans-  
12 port in Japan) could not be employed, and they had to  
13 be replaced by railways and sailing boats to meet the  
14 needs of domestic transport. The embargo on scrap iron  
15 had also far-reaching effects. The manufacture of  
16 steel had to be effected by the use of iron ores, which  
17 entailed the consumption of a large quantity of coal.  
18 Moreover, persons engaged in industries for the manu-  
19 facture of export goods lost their jobs, which created  
20 serious problems for finding work for the unemployed.  
21 Problems after problems came to the fore, too numerous  
22 to be enumerated here. If the plain fact of the situ-  
23 ation had bluntly been made public that the economic  
24 difficulties confronting Japan resulted from the economic  
25 blockade imposed by America, Britain and the Netherlands,

1 and that Japanese economic life was on the eve of bank-  
2 ruptcy, it would have inflamed an anti-American national  
3 sentiment so as to seriously impede our negotiation  
4 with the U.S.A. We, therefore, made use of such phrases  
5 as the 'strengthening of national defense power,' 'war-  
6 time structure,' etc., to direct the endeavors of the  
7 nation toward increased production and to make the  
8 people be resigned for the time being to the strained  
9 state of national economy.

10 "It is true that the Commodity Mobilization  
11 Plan of 1941 somewhat increased allotments for munitions  
12 of war in view of the international tension then pre-  
13 vailing as well as of the China Incident, but they were  
14 by no means such as would make a war with America and  
15 Britain feasible.

16 "It may be noticed that although various  
17 economic plans were styled 'Mobilization' plans, a  
18 grandiose term apparently connoting military preparations,  
19 they were, in fact, plans made for the allocation of  
20 commodities, labor and transportation with an eye to  
21 readjustments in domestic economy, out of the supplies  
22 allocated to civilian use after deducting what had been  
23 set aside for the Army and the Navy. The making of plans  
24 regarding the uses of the supplies allocated to the  
25 Army and the Navy, was, of course, outside the purview



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1 of the Planning Board, which was not informed of such  
2 uses. It may also be noted that economic mobilization  
3 plans were not prepared by the Planning Board in an  
4 autonomous way. Various ministries presented their  
5 respective demands for allocations to the Planning  
6 Board, and in case the total of such demands exceeded  
7 the amount of supply for the current year, the Planning  
8 Board rendered its good offices by negotiating with  
9 various ministries so that, through mutual concessions  
10 and compromises, the total amount demanded by the  
11 ministries be curtailed to the amount capable of supply.  
12 The Planning Board functioned thus as a sort of con-  
13 ciliation board. It was not invested with any power  
14 to make an order binding on the ministries. So long,  
15 therefore, as no compromise was arrived at between the  
16 ministries, no economic plan could come into being.  
17 Nor was the Planning Board invested with any authority  
18 to execute the plans so prepared.

19 "It is far from the truth to allege that as  
20 President of the Planning Board I had an all-important  
21 authority and influence on Japanese economy, (page 16,930  
22 of record). The allegation that the Key Industrial  
23 bodies Ordinance was prepared during my tenure of office  
24 is not true. As a matter of fact this Ordinance had  
25 been deliberated upon and the outlines thereof had been

1 formulated prior to my assumption of office (exhibit  
2 2225, page 15,963 of record). At the time I assumed  
3 office, the Planning Board had nothing to do with its  
4 preparation, the draft outlines of the Ordinance having  
5 already been in the hands of the Legislative Bureau.

6 "The testimony of Mr. Liebert that the  
7 President of the Planning Board controlled Japanese  
8 economy together with the presidents of control associ-  
9 ations (page 8,403 of record) is certainly an error.  
10 The Planning Board had no direct connection with any  
11 control association. The organization and operations  
12 of control associations were in charge of the ministries  
13 concerned and not of the Planning Board.

14 "It is an error and a misunderstanding for the  
15 prosecution to imply in reliance on Mr. Liebert's  
16 testimony (page 8,476 of record) that I was responsible  
17 for the organization of the Imperial Petroleum Company  
18 (page 16,931 of record). Not only were matters relative  
19 to that company outside the purview of the Planning  
20 Board but the law regarding the formation of the Imperial  
21 Petroleum Company had already been promulgated before  
22 I assumed office, viz., as early as in March 1941, in  
23 pursuance of which the said company was organized in  
24 September as a matter of course over which I had no  
25 control. Mr. Liebert himself in another connection



1 correctly states the date on which the law was promul-  
2 gated, (page 8,290 of record).

3 "(40) Exhibit 1142, page 10,231 of record, .  
4 KIDO's Diary, September 29, 1941 (Re: My explanations  
5 made in the Imperial Presence concerning rubber and tin  
6 resources in the U.S.A.).

7 "On September 29, 1941 I received a telephone  
8 message from Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA by which I  
9 was requested by Marquis KIDO to proceed to the Imperial  
10 Palace and explain to His Majesty concerning the rubber  
11 and tin resources in the U.S.A.

12 "The tenor of my explanations was, that even  
13 if as a result of war the U.S.A. should be prevented  
14 from importing rubber and tin from the southern areas,  
15 it would not imply any vital blow to her, for they  
16 might be replaced by imports from South America. I  
17 also said that rubber could be artificially manufactured  
18 and that large scale production of artificial rubber  
19 would be feasible in the U.S.A.

20 "(41) Exhibit 2280, page 16,253, KIDO's  
21 Diary, October 1, 1941, (Informal Talks concerning our  
22 Policy toward the U.S.A.).

23 "By October, 1941, the far-reaching effects  
24 of the economic severance were beginning to manifest  
25 themselves. A section of the Army circles which had

1 minimized them became conscious of the grave situation  
2 brought about by our economic isolation. The opinion  
3 came more and more to the fore that to wait for any  
4 successful negotiation with America would be to wait  
5 for the day of our economic starvation, and that we  
6 should find a way out of the predicament by taking an  
7 offensive prior to the consummation of American war  
8 preparations. On the other hand, ~~Prime~~ Minister KONOYE  
9 seemed to have felt himself quite helpless. I called  
10 on Marquis KIDO and conversed with him on the desira-  
11 bility of encouraging the Prime Minister to redouble  
12 his efforts to bring the American-Japanese negotiation  
13 to a success.

14 "(42) Exhibit 1148, page 10,250 of record;  
15 exhibit 1147, page 10246 of record; exhibit 2250,  
16 page 16,199 of record (circumstances in the closing  
17 days of the KONOYE Cabinet).

18 "At the time of the dissolution of the KONOYE  
19 Cabinet, I played the part of a messenger between  
20 KONOYE and TOJO, KONOYE and KIDO, and KIDO and TOJO.  
21 In this liaison work I acted strictly as messenger and  
22 the words of these three men then conveyed to me are  
23 still fresh in my memory.

24 "Therefore, it is submitted that of the evi-  
25 dence produced by the prosecution those passages which



1 are in conflict with what I stated minutely and with  
2 meticulous care in Part I of my affidavit do not con-  
3 form to the actual facts.

4 "(43) Exhibit 1331, page 11,943 of record;  
5 exhibit 1332, page 11,947 of record (The Sixth Com-  
6 mittee and Outline of Economic Counter-plans for the  
7 Southern Areas).

8 "In the last days of November 1941, the Govern-  
9 ment was inclined to the opinion that the opening of  
10 hostilities for national self-defense against America,  
11 Britain and the Netherlands might be unavoidable in view  
12 of the surrounding circumstances, and they came to make  
13 studies to provide for such event. In order to supple-  
14 ment materials necessary for carrying on the said war,  
15 the Cabinet meeting of November 28 decided to organize  
16 as committee consisting of the officials of the Planning  
17 Board, and of the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy  
18 Ministries to work out plans for the development, ac-  
19 quisition, and control of resources in the southern  
20 areas which might possibly be occupied. On December 2,  
21 when the opening of hostilities had been decided upon,  
22 the Prime Minister ordered me to act as chairman of the  
23 said committee and to execute its functions in collabor-  
24 ation with the members representing the above-mentioned  
25 ministries. The instructions then given by the Prime

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1 Minister regarding the work of the committee were in  
2 outline as follows:  
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1 "The thing to be most feared after the  
2 outbreak of war with America, Britain and the Nether-  
3 lands is that dubious and irresponsible enterprisers  
4 proceed to the southern areas in a disorderly manner,  
5 taking advantage of the military expedition. They are  
6 liable to come into conflict with the local population  
7 and to disturb the local economy. They are apt, more-  
8 over, to waste our funds and materials which are  
9 already deficient. Adequate measures should therefore  
10 be devised for developing the southern regions so that  
11 such evils might not occur.'

12 "The outline of policy regarding the southern  
13 areas prepared by the sixth committee were in the nature  
14 of wartime measures so formulated as to realize the  
15 Prime Minister's instructions.

16 "(44) Exhibit 1240, page 10,685 of record  
17 (signing the Imperial Rescript declaring war.)

18 "I signed the Imperial Rescript declaring war.  
19 War was certainly not what I desired, but I thought  
20 that the opening of hostilities was unavoidable for  
21 defensive purposes so long as an ultimatum had already  
22 been delivered to us and we were placed in a situation  
23 liable to be militarily attacked at any moment.

24 "(45) Exhibit 1271, page 11,342 (Re:  
25 Explanations at a Budget Committee of the House of

1 Representatives and in reply to an interpellation of  
2 Representative SAKURAI, Hyogoro, made explanations as  
3 mentioned by the prosecution.

4 "(46) Exhibit 1971A, page 14,505, (Re:  
5 Treatment of Prisoners of War.)

6 "The prosecution seems to accuse me of  
7 having collaborated with the employment of prisoners  
8 of war for military purposes, in reliance on a document  
9 called the Foreign Affairs Monthly Report which had  
10 been prepared and circulated without any knowledge  
11 of the Planning Board. If so, it certainly would be  
12 a false accusation. For the Planning Board had not  
13 the slightest authority concerning the treatment of  
14 prisoners of war. It is unimaginable that the Planning  
15 Board should, even without my knowledge, have held a  
16 conference under its auspices or to have participated  
17 in any way in the formulation of policies thereon.

18 "(47) Exhibit 687, page 12,070 of record  
19 (Re: Deliberations on the Establishment of the Greater  
20 East Asia Ministry.)

21 "The prosecution alleges that I played an  
22 important role at the conference of the Privy Council  
23 deliberating on the Organization of the Greater East  
24 Asia Ministry. As a matter of fact I attended the  
25 conference as an explaining member to clarify the



1 position of the government regarding the government  
2 measure.

3 "(48) Exhibit 1272, page 11,353 of record  
4 (Ott's telegram, concerning German decoration.)

5 "About the end of September, 1942, I re-  
6 ceived an invitation from the German Embassy to  
7 attend a ceremony conferring decorations, I had no  
8 interest in any decoration to be conferred on me by  
9 the German Government, for I had entertain an antipathy  
10 to Nazi ideology. I notified the Embassy declining  
11 to accept the invitation (exhibit 2247, page 16,180  
12 of record.) Indeed, I must confess that I listened  
13 with a sardonic smile when at this Tribunal Ott's  
14 telegram was read. After the outbreak of the Russo-  
15 German War, I advised the Premier that since Germany  
16 attacked the Soviet Union without giving any notice  
17 to Japan and that immediately after Japan's conclusion  
18 of a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union Japan  
19 should recede from the Triple Alliance. I do not  
20 know whether or not Ambassador Ott had heard of this  
21 from someone and concluded that 'my attitude toward  
22 Germany was ambiguous' (as stated in the telegram).  
23 Ott's report concerning me in exhibit 1272 contains  
24 a number of inaccuracies. I never knew that I was  
25 called Vice-Premier of the TOJO Cabinet. The order

1 of rank in the Japanese Cabinet at official events  
2 was a sheer matter to be determined by court precedence,  
3 and not indicative of any political significance as  
4 seems to be implied in Ambassador Ott's statement.  
5 Apart from my official relationship there was no  
6 special personal intimacy between General TOJO and  
7 myself such as certainly existed between Prince KONOYE  
8 and myself.

9 "The aforesaid decoration was later sent to  
10 my residence, and as it would have been awkward to  
11 return it, I just kept it.

12 "(49) Re: Total War Institute (exhibit  
13 3372, page 32,008 of record.)

14 "I understood at the time that the Institute  
15 was a place where academic studies were made and  
16 persons who would be needed in time of war were educated.  
17 I was appointed counselor to the Institute, but it was  
18 a nominal post ex officio accorded to me as Chief of  
19 the Political Section of the China Affairs Board. "While  
20 I was counselor I never visited the Institute and the  
21 Institute did not send me nor did I ever see any docu-  
22 ment embodying the results of the Institute studies.

23 "I remember that I attended either the  
24 entrance or graduation ceremony with other ministers  
25 of state at the invitation of the principal of the



1 Institute. However, in December 1943, I ceased to  
2 be a minister, having resigned from the TOJO Cabinet  
3 in October 1943, and moreover, was then traveling  
4 in Kyushu for about a month. Therefore, the state-  
5 ment by the witness MURAKAMI that I was present at  
6 a ceremony in December must surely be due to an  
7 error in his memory.

8 "(50) Exhibit 126, (Re: Decorations.)

9 "I was conferred the Third-Class Order of  
10 the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun in recognition of  
11 my services in the Manchurian Incident. And I was  
12 conferred the Second-Class Order of the Double Rays  
13 of the Rising Sun in recognition of my services in  
14 the China Incident.  
15

16 "However, the former was, so far as I know,  
17 conferred on all colonels in active service without  
18 any special merit. The latter was conferred on all  
19 majors in active service also without any special  
20 merit. It may also be noted that at the time of the  
21 conferment of the two decorations, I had already been  
22 conferred decorations of the third and second class  
23 respectively of other descriptions.

24 "At Tokyo, Japan, on this 24th day of  
25 November, 1947." Signed "SUZUKI, Teiichi."

1 MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, I should like to  
ask the witness one question.

2 Q Mr. SUZUKI, will you please state whether  
3 or not protests from foreign governments as to  
4 treatment of prisoners of war were ever presented  
5 at any cabinet meeting?

6 A No.

7 MR. LEVIN: I believe some defense counsel  
8 wish to ask some questions.

9 ACTING PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

10 MR. LOGAN: On behalf of the defendant KIDO,  
11 if the Tribunal please, I would like to ask a few  
12 questions on direct.

13 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

14 BY MR. LOGAN:

15 Q Do you recall the Ogikubo Conference that  
16 was held at Prince KONOYE's home on October 12, 1941?

17 A Yes, I do.

18 Q You state in your affidavit that you made a  
19 report of what transpired at that meeting. Is that  
20 correct?

21 A Yes.

22 Q What did you do with the minutes of the meet-  
23 ing?

24 A I took them down in a small notebook, and  
25



1 immediately after taking them down I handed them to  
2 Prince KONOYE.

3 Q What did he do with them?

4 A That I do not know.

5 Q Was the Secretary of the cabinet, TOMITA,  
6 there?

7 A No, he was not.

8 Q Wasn't he at Prince KONOYE's home but in  
9 another room and did not attend the conference?

10 A I don't know whether he was there or not.

11 Q You have heard the reading of KIDO's diary  
12 from his affidavit for the date of October 12, 1941,  
13 have you not?

14 A I did hear it, but I don't recall exactly at  
15 the present moment.

16 Q And do you remember that KIDO records in there  
17 that TOMITA, Chief Secretary of the cabinet, visited  
18 him and gave him a report of what transpired at that  
19 meeting on that day?

20 A I did.

21 Q And is the report of that meeting as set  
22 forth in the diary entry of October 12, 1941, correct?

23 A Generally, the entry for that date is correct  
24 as far as it concerns the Ogikubo Conference, but I  
25 should like to say here that the memo--the notes which

1 I took on that meeting did not cover any decisions  
2 which were reached by the War, Navy, Foreign, and  
3 Prime Ministers. "We ministers talked -- discussed  
4 the various problems among ourselves, but we were  
5 not able to come to any decision on them.

6 THE MONITOR: Slight correction: "There  
7 was no decision reached at that meeting. Therefore  
8 there is no memo concerning any decisions."

9 The rest is correct.

10 Q The last sentence of the diary entry says  
11 that the Foreign Minister should study the above to  
12 find out whether it is possible or not, that is, after  
13 reciting the advice and suggestions which had been  
14 made at the meeting, and what they agreed upon.

15 In view of that you don't contend that Marquis  
16 KIDO is setting forth that there was a definite agree-  
17 ment made at the meeting, are you?

18 A I don't know what TOMITA may have told Marquis  
19 KIDO, but the notes which I took at the meeting did  
20 not indicate that we had reached any final decision  
21 at all. The last thing I remember about that meet-  
22 ing is that the Navy Minister said, "Then I should  
23 like to have it decided that the negotiations are to  
24 be continued."  
25

ACTING PRESIDENT: "We will recess for fifteen



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minutes.

1                   (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was  
2           taken until 1500, after which the proceedings  
3           were resumed as follows:)

4                   MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
5           Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

6                   ACTING PRESIDENT: Mr. Logan.

7           BY MR. LOGAN (Continued):

8                   Q   In any event, is it not a fact that the matters  
9           that were discussed at the conference were left to the  
10          Foreign Minister to give them further study?

11                   A   Yes.

12                   MR. LOGAN: Thank you.

13                   MR. LEVIN: Mr. President, I don't believe  
14           there are any other defense counsel who desire to  
15           examine, and the prosecution may now cross-examine.

16                   ACTING PRESIDENT: Brigadier Nolan.

17                   CROSS-EXAMINATION

18                   BY BRIGADIER NOLAN:

19                   Q   General SUZUKI, in your affidavit, exhibit 3605,  
20           on page 2, you state, in effect, that by reason of your  
21           long residences in China and by reason of your interview  
22           with General Chiang Kai-shek in 1927 you were sympa-  
23           thetic with the Chinese nationalist movement, and on  
24           page 4 of your affidavit, you state that it was your  
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1 conviction that Japan should assist and co-operate  
2 with the new China represented by the nationalist  
3 party.

4 Would you say that the Army, the War Ministry,  
5 and the General Staff were sympathetic to that nation-  
6 alistic movement?

7 A One could not say positively that all were so  
8 disposed.

9 Q But, one might say positively that some were  
10 not so disposed?

11 A One could.

12 Q Now, in the years 1932 and '33, you were  
13 attached to the Bureau of Military Affairs. What were  
14 your particular duties, General SUZUKI?

15 A My duties were, first, liaison matters in  
16 regard to military matters concerning China; second,  
17 matters relating to Japanese military advisers and  
18 military instructors sent to China; third, matters  
19 relating to military students of the Chinese Government  
20 sent to study in the Japanese Army. Those were my  
21 main duties.

22 Q And, did your duties bring you to make a  
23 study of the Manchurian problem and the China Inci-  
24 dent in relation to China?

25 A Yes.



1 Q And, did you go to Shanghai in 1932?

2 A Yes, I did.

3 Q Why did you go?

4 A The Manchurian Incident had just broken out  
5 and at the same time anti-Japanese feeling -- the  
6 anti-Japanese movement in China proper had been intens-  
7 ified. I was sent to Shanghai to investigate the  
8 Manchurian Incident and conditions in China proper.

9 Q And, did you go again to North China in May  
10 of 1933 after the Tang-Ku Truce was signed?

11 A Yes.

12 Q And, did you meet Hwang Fu and other Chinese  
13 leaders in North China?

14 A Yes.

15 Q And, after your return, did you make a report  
16 to the War Ministry?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Now, tell me, at that time was the Army con-  
19 sidering the revision of the policies towards China as  
20 a result of the signing of the Tang-Ku Truce?

21 A I have no exact recollection.

22 Q Do you remember taking part in any discussions  
23 concerning a revision of policy towards China?

24 A No.

25 Q With your intimate knowledge of affairs in

1 China, how do you explain the fact that you were not  
2 consulted about this matter?

3 A If such a thing had actually occurred, I may  
4 have been consulted, but I have no recollection of the  
5 matter of which you speak occurring.

6 Q Do you remember a question of the policy to-  
7 ward China arising in July of 1933 after your return  
8 from North China?

9 A I have no exact recollection on that point,  
10 but as a result of the Manchurian Incident, the Central  
11 Army authorities were apprehensive lest the military  
12 movement, then taking place, should extend down into  
13 North China. I remember that my superiors were racking  
14 their heads as to how to prevent this from happening.

15 BRIGADIER NOLAN: May the witness be shown  
16 IPS document 3147 please?

17 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
18 to the witness.)

19 Q And, will you please direct your attention  
20 to item C of that document. I think it is marked,  
21 General SUZUKI, in the book.

22 (Whereupon, the witness examined  
23 the document.)

24 THE MONITOR: Brigadier Nolan, our copy has  
25 no A-B-C's on it. It has 1-2-3. Could that be the



reason that the witness is confused?

1 BRIGADIER NOLAN: It could be "3" instead of  
2 "C".

3 It is No. Hei.

4 THE MONITOR: Yes, No. Hei, and No. 3 is on  
5 the next page, is it?

6 BRIGADIER NOLAN: Yes. Have you found it?

7 THE MONITOR: Yes, we found it.

8 (Whereupon, the monitor spoke to  
9 the witness in Japanese.)

10 ACTING PRESIDENT: Have your assistant point  
11 it out to him, Brigadier.

12 BY BRIGADIER NOLAN (Continued):

13 Q Have you found it, General SUZUKI? Have you  
14 found the document?

15 A Yes, I have.

16 Q Have you seen that document before?

17 A I have no recollection.

18 Q Well, now, will you look on it and see what  
19 is written in handwriting on the front of it.

20 A (Reading) "No. Hei. Document received from  
21 Lieutenant Colonel SUZUKI on 12 July 1933, with the  
22 note that as the War Ministry and the Army General  
23 Staffs have unanimously agreed on the following gist  
24 of the policy, it is desired that the Government will  
25 decide its policies along the lines of this document."

1 Q Did you hand that document to MORISHIMA?

2 A I do not remember.

3 Q Do you remember seeing that document before?

4 A May I have a few minutes in which to look  
5 through it?

6 Q Certainly.

7 (The witness examined the document.)

8 A On looking through this policy, I cannot  
9 remember anything about it.

10 Q Who was MORISHIMA?

11 A There was a section chief in the Asiatic Affairs  
12 Bureau of the Foreign Office by the name of MORISHIMA.

13 Q I want you to tell me to whom, on the 12th of  
14 July, 1933, you delivered or caused to be delivered  
15 that document in your hands to MORISHIMA.

16 A I have no clear recollection.

17 Q Will you look at the handwriting on it which  
18 says "Document received from Lt. Col. SUZUKI on 12th  
19 July 1933..." and see if that refreshes your recollection?  
20

21 A At the time documents were exchanged frequently  
22 between our office and the Foreign Office and this  
23 document may have been one of them, but I have no  
24 recollection of the document itself. I cannot say  
25 anything exact about it.

Q Why would MORISHIMA say that he had received



1 it from you, if you had not given it or caused it to  
2 be given to him?

3 A Well, that is a matter of MORISHIMA's  
4 recollection. If it was so, it may have been me that  
5 sent it to him.

6 Q Well, will you admit that it was you who sent  
7 it to him?

8 A I cannot testify here with assuredness that I  
9 did send such a document.

10 Q Well, testify to the best of your ability as  
11 to whether or not you did send it.

12 A I may have sent it, but my recollection is not  
13 sure.

14 BRIGADIER NOLAN: I am going to offer this  
15 document in evidence, Mr. President, in view of the  
16 answer of the witness that he may have sent it, but that his  
17 recollection is not sure, on the ground that he does  
18 not deny what is contained on the face of the document,  
19 namely, that it was received from him.

20 MR. LEVIN: We object to its admission, if  
21 the Tribunal please, on the ground that the witness has  
22 not identified it as his own, he has no clear recollection  
23 of it and he states very truthfully the only thing that he  
24 can say is that there is some possibility that the thing  
25 might have been handed to him, but he does not identify

1 it sufficiently to permit its admissibility in  
2 evidence.

3 BRIGADIER NOLAN: To conform with the ordinary  
4 procedure, Mr. President, I should offer for identifi-  
5 cation only the bound file of the Foreign Office  
6 entitled "China Policy Reference Material, Volume I,  
7 August 1932 to September 1933"; that for identification  
8 only.

9 CLERK OF THE COURT: Pamphlet entitled "China  
10 Policy Reference Material," compiled on September 1933,  
11 will receive exhibit No. 3607 for identification only.

12 (Whereupon, the document above re-  
13 ferred to was marked prosecution exhibit No.  
14 3607 for identification.)

15 BRIGADIER NOLAN: And I offer in evidence the  
16 item from that book, "No. Hei!"

17 MR. LEVIN: Our objection goes to the offer  
18 of the excerpt 3147-C, "No. Hei", and I might add, if  
19 the Tribunal please, that I think the evidence disclosed  
20 that there was another SUZUKI on the General Staff at  
21 or about that time. I cannot identify him at this  
22 moment.  
23

24 ACTING PRESIDENT: By a majority the objection  
25 is overruled. The document will be admitted.

CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document 3147-C



will receive exhibit No. 3607-A.

(Whereupon, the document above referred to was marked prosecution exhibit No. 3607-A and received in evidence.)

BRIGADIER NOLAN: I will read only the marked portions of exhibit 3607-A:

"/The Cover/

"No. Hei. Matters decided upon as the opinion of the Army in the beginning of July 1933.

"/Handwritings on the first page/

"Top Secret /stamp/ /Reference/

"No. Hei. Document received from Lt. Col. SUZUKI on 12th July 1933, with the note that as the War Ministry and the Army General Staffs have unanimously agreed on the following gist of the policy, it is desired that the Government will decide its policies along the lines of this document. MORISHIMA /signed/ 6 July 1933."

Lower on that page:

"The Gist of Measures

"2. We must make the North China Regime suppress the National Party's anti-Japanese activities in North China and make the party gradually reduce itself until its final dissolution."

And paragraphs 11 and 12:

1 "We should make every possible effort to  
2 prevent the foreign powers, especially U.S.A., Britain  
3 and the U.S.S.R. from expanding their influence over  
4 China and from giving support to the government officials  
5 the impoverished economic conditions of those foreign  
6 powers and make them understand their ambitions over  
7 China and their untrustworthiness.  
8

9 "12. The policies taken by the Nanking Govern-  
10 ment up to now based on the platform of the National  
11 Party have been permanently and fundamentally contra-  
12 dictory to the Empire's policies. We, therefore, should  
13 proclaim to the world that the Imperial Government as  
14 well as its people shall be hostile to the Nanking  
15 Government as long as it does not alter its past attitude  
16 towards Japan, but that we are willing to shake hands  
17 with China and her people under justifiable and fair  
18 conditions at the earliest possible date."  
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Q Now, General SUZUKI--

1 MR. LEVIN: May it please the Tribunal,  
2 at this time I ask that this evidence be disregarded,  
3 in view of the fact that we cannot make a motion that  
4 it be stricken, on the ground that it appears from the  
5 document, itself, that this is a decision of the Army  
6 General Staffs; that is, "the Army General Staffs  
7 have unanimously agreed on the following..." and that  
8 it does not appear that this is the statement of  
9 SUZUKI, himself. This is the only form in which I can  
10 make the objection because I have no opportunity of  
11 examining the document practically before it is read.  
12 All I could do is glance at it.

13  
14 ACTING PRESIDENT: It says "the War Ministry  
15 and the Army General Staffs have agreed..."

16 By a majority, the motion is denied.

17 Q General SUZUKI, reverting, for the moment,  
18 to exhibit 3607-A, would you say that that document  
19 expressed your views towards China and the Nationalist  
20 Government?

21 A No, they don't.

22 Q And when you were talking to Mr. Hu Lin,  
23 as is set out in exhibit 3603, you were giving him  
24 your private opinion, were you, and not that of your  
25 superiors regarding the cooperation which should exist

between Japan and General Chiang Kai-shek?

1       A     It was my own private opinion expressed  
2 during the course of a private conversation.

3       Q     Why didn't you tell him what the policy of  
4 the War Ministry and the General Staff really was?

5       A     According to my recollection, the policy  
6 of the army towards China proper -- both before the  
7 Manchurian Incident and after its outbreak -- was a  
8 desire for the establishment of satisfactory relations.

9       Q     And would they do that by making the National  
10 Party gradually reduce itself until its final dissolu-  
11 tion?

12       A     I never thought along those lines.

13       Q     But you misled Mr. Hu Lin as to the real  
14 intentions of your superiors, did you not?

15       A     I didn't say anything that was wrong.

16       Q     But you neglected to tell him what was right?

17       A     No.

18       Q     What was the answer?

19       A     No.

20       Q     Now, if you will direct your attention,  
21 please, to page 9 of the English copy of your affi-  
22 davit, paragraph 6, I observe you say that you deeply  
23 deplored the China Incident, and that in December of  
24 1938 you accepted the post of Chief of the Political  
25



Section of the China Affairs Board?

1 A Yes.

2 Q The China Affairs Board, itself, was estab-  
3 lished in that same month of December, 1938?

4 A Yes.

5 Q And you were the first head of the Political  
6 Section?

7 A Yes.

8 Q And you were chiefly responsible for the  
9 organization of the board, were you not?

10 A I was not one of the chief persons respon-  
11 sible for the establishment of that board.

12 Q Well, you were one of the organizers of  
13 the board?

14 A Yes.

15 Q The Prime Minister was the president, and  
16 certain vice-ministers were vice-presidents?

17 A The vice-presidents were cabinet ministers.

18 Q Yes. The principal officers in China were  
19 at Peiping, Shanghai; is that so?

20 A Yes.

21 Q And there were other officers at Kalgan, in  
22 Inner Mongolia, and at Amoy?

23 A Yes.

24 Q I suggest to you that the China Affairs Board

1 dealt virtually with all matters relative to China,  
2 with the exception of matters relating to the army and  
3 the navy?

4 A The China Affairs Board handled matters in  
5 China regarding China and Japan, but with the exception  
6 of foreign relations.

7 Q Now, it handled industries, transportation,  
8 economic problems; is that so?

9 A It handled administrative -- business affairs  
10 in relation to those items.

11 A And its control was effected through the  
12 North China Development Company and the Central China  
13 Development Company?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Through these companies, which were controlled  
16 by the China Affairs Board, the wishes or desires of  
17 the Japanese Government were carried out in China?

18 A Matters relating to economics -- relating to  
19 economy in the field of operations of the two companies  
20 were handled.

21 Q Yes. And the China Affairs Board also gave  
22 directions to the provisional governments in China,  
23 did it not?

24 A They did not give guidance.

25 Q Well, what did they give? Advice?



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1       A     I believe they did, at times.

2       Q     What did they do about the Chinese school  
3 textbooks?

4       A     I don't remember well.

5       Q     If I told you that the China Affairs Board  
6 revised those textbooks, would that refresh your  
7 memory?

8       A     Since textbooks and other cultural matters  
9 were handled by the Cultural Section, I do not have any  
10 thorough knowledge as to those matters.  
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Q Well, just give me the knowledge you have,  
1 General SUZUKI.

2 A I do not know whether or not the China Affairs  
3 Board actually revised the textbooks of China itself.

4 Q Well, what textbooks did they revise?

5 A The very fact as to whether or not they re-  
6 vised the textbooks is not in my recollection.

7 Q All right. Is there anything in your recollec-  
8 tion about the control of opium and narcotics?

9 A No.

10 Q That was exercised through the political division  
11 of your China Affairs Board, was it not?

12 A No, I think the matters relating to opium were  
13 handled by the economic section.

14 Q Well, who handled the profits from the opium  
15 trade? Did you?

16 A No, I know nothing at all about them.

17 Q Did any of them pass through your hands or were  
18 any of them placed by you in a secret fund?

19 A No, absolutely not.

20 Q Who was the head of the hong at Shanghai?

21 A I don't know.

22 Q You said something a few moments ago about  
23 your board not having anything to do with diplomacy.  
24 Am I right in saying that?  
25



1 A It had nothing to do with Japan's relations  
2 with third nations in China.

3 Q Is it not a fact that when the China Affairs  
4 Board was being organized, there was opposition to its  
5 establishment from the Foreign Ministry?

6 A I learned of that later, but since I was in  
7 Manchukuo at the time of the founding -- up to the time  
8 of the founding of the China Affairs Board, I did not  
9 know anything about those circumstances.

10 Q You will remember the resignation of Foreign  
11 Minister UGAKI?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Was one of the reasons for his resignation the  
14 creation of the China Affairs Board, and the consequent  
15 limitation placed upon diplomatic relations with China?

16 A From what Prince KONOYE told me, General  
17 UGAKI's reason for resigning was incomprehensible.

18 Q I suggest to you that the China Affairs Board  
19 was established and organized because the military  
20 authorities did not want the Foreign Office interfering  
21 in China affairs.

22 A I never heard about those circumstances.

23 Q Now, reverting to page 10 of your affidavit,  
24 at the top -- of the English -- I see that you say that  
25 many of the features of the policy relative to the China

1 Incident and decided by the High Command and the govern-  
2 ment were diametrically opposed to your fundamental  
3 ideas on China. What was the policy decided upon by the  
4 Higher Command and the government?

5 A The decisions that were standing at the time  
6 I returned to Japan were that of January 1938 and of  
7 October 1938 -- these two.

8 Q Well, what were they?

9 A I don't remember all the details, but I will  
10 tell you as far as I do remember. The general line of  
11 those two decisions was that the --

12 Correction: That Japan hoped for the establish-  
13 ment of a new government in China, and in cooperation  
14 with that government would work for the stability of  
15 East Asia and for Sino-Japanese cooperation.

16 Q And was that diametrically opposed to your  
17 fundamental idea?

18 A Yes.

19 Q And what was your idea?

20 A I felt that though the army talked of establish-  
21 ing a new regime in China, such a regime would naturally  
22 be established under the authority and influence of the  
23 Japanese Army, and it would be difficult to hope for a  
24 spontaneous expression of will on the part of the Chinese  
25 people.



1 THE MONITOR: To establish a government of  
2 their own.

3 A (Continuing) Furthermore, I felt that it was  
4 wrong for Japan to possess an economic system in China  
5 based on Japanese laws along that line.

6 BRIGADIER NOLAN: I wonder, Mr. President, if  
7 I might relinquish the lectern to Mr. Logan, who has a  
8 brief statement to make to the Tribunal, and continue  
9 with my cross-examination in the morning?

10 ACTING PRESIDENT: Yes.

11 MR. LOGAN: If the Tribunal please, in my  
12 cross-examination of Admiral SHIMADA, I posed several  
13 questions on Captain Robinson's cross-examination on the  
14 basis of misquotation of KIDO's affidavit and diary,  
15 as it was shown in the transcript. I was subsequently  
16 informed by the court reporters that there was an error  
17 in the reporting of Captain Robinson's question, and that  
18 there was no misquotation by Captain Robinson.

19 I regret the incident, and ask that the record  
20 be corrected accordingly.

21 ACTING PRESIDENT: It will be so corrected.

22 MR. LOGAN: Thank you.

23 ACTING PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until nine-  
24 thirty Monday morning.

25 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment

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was taken until Monday, 15 December 1947,  
at 0930.)

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